Raghava Rao, J.
1. The question in this civil miscelaneous second appeal and this civil revision petition is whether the earnings of the heirs of a certain gurukkal in a temple which are in the shape of presents by devotees for archakathwam service rendered by them are liable to be attached as assets of the deceased gurukkal in their hands under a decree passed against them with reference to such assets. The Courts below have held that the earnings are not so liable.
2. Mr. Ramamurti contends before me that this decision is wrong. His point is that but for the fact that the right of archakathwam service devolved upon the judgment-debtors as heirs of the deceased gurukkal, they would not be entitled to earn the emoluments and that therefore the emoluments should be treated as assets liable to be attached. The fact, however, which this argument overlooks, is that even after the devolution of the archakathwam service by inheritance upon the judgment-debtors, there can be no question of the earning of the emoluments sought to be attached except by reason of personal services which are liable to foe rendered by the judgment-debtors in the temple. Mr. Ramamurti relies upon a judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in 'Nandkumar Dutt v. Ganesh Das' 58 All. 457. As the head note rightly bears, what we get as the decision in that case is, that in execution of a decree against the assets of a deceased person in the hands of his heir, the right to receive the offerings periodically in future can be attached and sold, as being such an asset, and not only the collections which have actually been made by the heir. With reference to the incident of the office there in Question, the Court (Sulaiman C. J. and Bennett J.) observes in its judgment at page 463 of the report thus,
'We consider therefore that in the present case it has not been proved that there is any connexion between the receipt of this share of the offerings and the performance of the service in the temples..... .Learned counsel for the appellant has argued a point of law which is not in the grounds of appeal and was not in his written statement. The point is that although the respondent can have the right of collections which had been received during the lifetime of Kameshwar and which might be attachable in execution of the decree against his assets, still the share of the offerings could not be attached as those offerings were future income to accrue. We do not think that this argument can be accepted for various reasons. For one reason the execution is sought against the assets of Kameshwar Panda, in the hands of his daughter, defendant 2. What was in the hands of defendant 2, the daughter of Kameshwar, was by inheritance his share, and as the share produced a certain annual income that income may be attached as it is one of the assets of the deceased.'
I am not satisfied that this decision is, even if sound, applicable to the facts of the case before me, where the connection between the performance of service by the judgment-debtors and the receipt of the offerings is something undisputed. In my opinion although the fact of inheritance to the gurukkal's office may have been the means by which the earnings of the judgment-debtors are taking place, they are earnings really for services which they themselves are performing. These cannot therefore be regarded as assets of the deceased in their hands which are liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree in question.
3. A Madras case has also been brought to my notice which is reported in 'Kadiryelusami Nayagar v. Eastern Development Corporation' 47 Mad. 411 That is a simple case uncomplicated by any question of earnings for service in any institution and all that is decided by the case, as the headnote shows, is that on the death of a debtor the incomeaccruing to his heir from landed property, of which the debtor died possessed, is assets of the debtor in the hands of the heir, liable to satisfy his debts within the meaning of Section 52 of the Civil P. C. Another Madras case which has been cited to me is a similarly uncomplicated case and takes the appellant no further than the one which I have discussed.
4. I am satisfied that none of the decisions cited concludes the point which I am called upon to decide in the present case. I am clearly and unhesitatingly of opinion that the view taken by the Courts below in both the civil miscellaneous second appeal and the revision petition is perfectly correct. Both the cases are therefore dismissed with costs of both the first and second respondents in the civil miscellaneous second appeal (one set) and of the only respondent in the civil revision petition.
5. Leave to appeal in the civil miscellaneous second appeal is refused.