1. The petitioners seek to revise an order by the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Ranipet staying further proceedings in a case upon his file brought under Section 211, Indian Penal Code. The order might be set aside on the short ground that the Sub-divisional Magistrate has no power to stay proceedings in his own Court. Under Section 344, Criminal Procedure Code, he may adjourn a case from time to time but that is not what he has done in the present instance. The counter-petitioner has been charged with having falsely accused certain persons of theft before the Village Headman, an offence punishable under Section 211. The case was duly reported by the Headman to the Police who referred it as false. Then the counter-petitioner being apprised of that fact put in a complaint before the Sub-Magistrate and the Sub-Magistrate recorded a written statement upon it. He allowed the prayer of the Police to strike the case off their file, but apparently passed no further orders on the complaint of the counter-petitioner. It was urged at the trial before the Sub-divisional Magistrate that inasmuch as the false charge was committed in a proceeding in the Sub-Magistrate's Court, to wit the complaint, he had no jurisdiction to enquire into the matter except on the complaint of the Sub-Magistrate under Section 476. He declined to go into this question and the matter was taken up to the learned Sessions Judge who informed him that it was a question which could not be postponed and that under the law if the offence was committed in the Sub-Magistrate's Court the complaint of the Sub-Magistrate would be necessary. The Sub-divisional Magistrate met this suggestion by finding that as a matter of fact there had been no complaint entertained by the Sub-Magistrate. His theory seems to be that on receiving the counter-petitioner's complaint the Sub-Magistrate merely threw it aside and what purports to be his statement endorsed on its back was not a sworn statement. It cannot be discovered from the record now before the Court how the Sub-divisional Magistrate came to hold that it was not a sworn statement. The ordinary presumption that a Magistrate does his duty would lead one to infer that it was a sworn statement, and Mr. Jayarama Aiyar concedes that it must be accepted as such. In these circumstances, the Sub-Magistrate clearly took cognizance of the complaint and any offence in regard to that complaint could only be prosecuted after action taken by him under Section 476. But it is now argued that it is unnecessary to consider this complaint at all and that the prosecution can proceed on the false charge made to the Village Headman and through him to the Police ignoring the subsequent complaint by the Sub-Magistrate altogether. This proposition is based on the authority of Ramasami v. The Queen-Empress ILR (1884) M 292, where no doubt it is observed that the prosecution did not require any sanction as the appellant was tried for making a false charge to the Police. This very point has been considered very fully in Tayebulla v. Emperor ILR (1916) C 1152 and Brown v. Ananda Lal Mullick ILR (1916) C 650 and there can be no doubt that when the person who preferred a false charge to the Police has also taken the same facts by way of complaint to the Magistrate, before that person can be prosecuted the complaint of the Magistrate is necessary. It would be a most extraordinary result if while the Magistrate was still engaged in trying a complaint and possibly inclined to believe the complainant, the complainant could himself be put into the dock in another proceeding on the allegation that he had preferred a false charge to the Police. I do not find therefore that the opinion of the Sub-divisional Magistrate can be supported on this ground. Accordingly I quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 20 of 1926 on his file as having been taken without cognizance.