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Alphanso Pinto Vs. Thukru Hengsu and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtChennai High Court
Decided On
Case NumberSecond Appeal No. 1314 of 1949
Judge
Reported inAIR1955Mad206; (1954)IIMLJ445
ActsTransfer of Property Act, 1882 - Sections 106 and 116
AppellantAlphanso Pinto
RespondentThukru Hengsu and anr.
Appellant AdvocateT. Krishna Rao, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateA. Narayana Pai, Adv.
DispositionAppeal dismissed
Cases ReferredGnanadesikam Pillai v. Antony Benathu Boopalarayar
Excerpt:
- - it is well established that if there is no agreement fixing the terms of a new lease, the terms of the old lease must be deemed to be applicable......has to be surrendered. so long as there is no defect in respect of these particulars and the period of notice is reasonable, it cannot be said that the notice is invalid, because the particulars as regards the tenancy are not accurately set out. i agree with the courts below that ex. b. 1 is a valid notice to quit.3. mr. krishna rao next contended that in any event the appellant is entitled to the value of the improvements effected by the defendants. unfortunately for the appellant, there are two obstacles in his way. the first is the clause in each of the three leases specifically providing that the tenants had no right to make any kind of improvements, and even if they made any improvements, they had no right to any compensation. there is also an admission in each of the three.....
Judgment:

Rajamannar, C.J.

1. This second appeal arises out ofa suit in ejectment. The tenant is the appellant. On 12-4-1933, the appellant and his father,the first defendant, executed in favour of theplaintiff-respondent, a chalgenichit in respect ofthe suit holding. The period of the lease wasone year, but after the efflux of the period thetenants did not surrender possession but continued to be in occupation. There was a renewalof the lease in 1937 and again in 1942, Exs. A. 14and A. 13. On 6-11-1945, the landlord issued aregistered notice calling upon the tenants to quitand deliver possession. The suit in ejectmentwas filed on 17-4-1946. Both the courts belowhave decreed the suit.

2. In second appeal, Mr. Krishna Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, urged two grounds. He first contended that there was no proper notice to quit. This contention is based entirely on the fact that in the notice to quit, Ex. B. 1, there is a reference to the chalgenichit dated 12-4-1933, but there is no reference to the two renewals in 1937 and 1942. I do not think that the omission to mention the two later leases, in any way renders the notice to quit improper or invalid. The notice in question contains the essential features of such a notice, namely, that it calls upon the tenants to quit and deliver possession, and it also prescribes a time within which the possession has to be surrendered. So long as there is no defect in respect of these particulars and the period of notice is reasonable, it cannot be said that the notice is Invalid, because the particulars as regards the tenancy are not accurately set out. I agree with the courts below that Ex. B. 1 is a valid notice to quit.

3. Mr. Krishna Rao next contended that in any event the appellant is entitled to the value of the improvements effected by the defendants. Unfortunately for the appellant, there are two obstacles in his way. The first is the clause in each of the three leases specifically providing that the tenants had no right to make any kind of improvements, and even if they made any improvements, they had no right to any compensation. There is also an admission in each of the three leases that the entire improvements on the property and the material itself all belong to the landlord and not to the tenants. Mr. Krishna Rao tried to get out of the mischief of this clause by arguing that the last of the leases, namely, the lease of 1942, had expired after a period of one year, and thereafter the defendants must be deemed to have been only tenants holding over, & the terms embodied in the clause above mentioned will not be one of the implied terms of the tenancy by holding over. I do not agree with this contention.

It is well established that if there is no agreement fixing the terms of a new lease, the terms of the old lease must be deemed to be applicable. Where the tenant holds over after the expiration of the term, he holds subject to all the covenants in the lease which are applicable to the new situation. The defendant must therefore be held to be subject to the covenant in respect of improvements contained in the original tease. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the ruling in -- 'Gnanadesikam Pillai v. Antony Benathu Boopalarayar : AIR1934Mad458 . That decision does not directly apply to the facts of this case. In that case, there was a collateral security for the payment of rent, and it was held that after the determination of the lease and there was a holding over, it is not, possible to carry over the collateral security, which was not part of the lease transaction so as to enable the plaintiff landlord to claim a charge for the arrears of rent for the whole of the subsequent period.

In that decision, reference was made to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in which it was held that a stipulation in the original lease that at the expiration of the term the lessee should give up possession without notice, could not be imported into the new tenancy, created by holding over and the acceptance of rent. But it does not follow that other terms, such as the liability to pay rent, to repair, and stipulations as regards improvements will not be imported into the tenancy created by the holding over. Mulla in his Commentary on the Transfer of Property Act, 3rd Edn., at page 738, gives some of the terms which have been held to apply in the case of a tenancy by holding over; a covenant to pay rent in advance, to repair, a proviso for re-entry for non-payment of rent, a covenant as to the user of the premises. The clause in question in the three leases is a provision in the nature of a covenant as to the user of the premises. This must be held to be one of the terms of the tenancy by holding over. The defendants will not, therefore, be entitled to claim any compensation for improvements.

4. There is, also another obstacle in the way of the appellant, and that is the finding of the lower appellate court that the plaintiff herself supplied timber to the defendant to effect repairs to the house which was on the property and other expenses were adjusted towards arrears of rent. The fact therefore is, there is no liability to pay any compensation. On this ground also the defendants will not be entitled to claim anything in respect of the improvements effected by them.

5. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

6. Mr. Krishna Rao prayed that some timeplay be given to his client to remove the improvements made by him. In the circumstances, Ithink a period of two months would be reasonable. There will be a direction that the defendants will have this time to remove the improvements effected, without causing any prejudice tothe holding.


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