1. The only question argued in this second appeal is one of limitation. The suit is for recovery of certain lands forming the manibham attached to the office of Meikkavalgar. The 1st defendant who held this office was dismissed on 5-9-95. Between that time and the date of suit he has remained in possession of the suit lands except certain items which he has sold and mortgaged to others. The suit was not instituted till 1912 and the learned Subordinate Judge has held that it was consequently barred under Article 144 of the Limitation Act.
2. Mr. Anantakrishna Aiyar for the appellant has attacked this conclusion on two grounds. His. first contention is that, as regards the items which the 1st defendant, the dismissed Meikkavalgar retained in his possession, the suit is not time-barred because something more than mete enjoyment of the income of the lands was required to constitute adverse possession. His reliance is on a decision of the Privy Council in Jalandhar Thakur v. Jharula Das I.L.R. (1914) Cal. 244 but that decision is easily distinguishable. No possession of land was concerned in the suit. That decision related to claim not for possession of land but for a share of temple offerings, and it was merely held that adversely taking and appropriating day by day a share of the offerings gave no title to income claimed. That decision was in fact distinguished on this very ground in Dhanushkotirayadu v. Venkayala Venkataratnam : (1920)38MLJ320 by a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a member. We do not think that decision had any bearing on a case like the present.
3. The appellant's second point is this. The 2nd plaintiff who brought the suit died pendente lite and the 3rd plaintiff who succeeded to the office was, as his successor, allowed to continue the litigation. Mr. Ananthakrishna Iyer contends that, although the 2nd plaintiff may be barred, the 3rd plaintiff is not. Apart from the question whether the suit can properly be treated as one instituted by the 3rd plaintiff, we do not think that even if we decided to do so that makes any difference as to the question of limitation. Subramania Gurukkal v. Ammakannu Animal (1921) 14 L.W. 376 is authority for holding that in a suit of this nature the 2nd plaintiff's successor is just as much barred by limitation as the 2nd plaintiff himself. Dhanuskotirayadu v. Venkayala Venkataratnam : (1920)38MLJ320 already quoted is to the same effect.
4. The appellants contend that these are no longer good law on this point after the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Sri Vidya Varuthi Thirthaswamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar , We have carefully considered this judgment and we can see no reason for holding that it overrules or renders inapplicable the decisions quoted. The basis of their Lordships' decision, as appears at the close of their judgment, in this particular was that, during the life-time of the first successor of the alienor, the possession of the plaintiff in that case could not be treated as adverse because that alienor recognised him as a tenant and must be taken to have made a fresh lease to enure for the life-time of himself, the then Mahant. We think in the present case that the 3rd plaintiff is equally barred by limitation with the 2nd plaintiff.
5. The second appeals are dismissed with costs (one set of costs to be divided.)