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Rasa Goundan and anr. Vs. Ramai Goundan - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtChennai
Decided On
Case NumberSecond Appeal No. 1790 of 1946
Judge
Reported inAIR1950Mad276
ActsMadras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 - Sections 44B and 44B(2)
AppellantRasa Goundan and anr.
RespondentRamai Goundan
Appellant AdvocateG. Chandrasekhara Sastri, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateT.E. Ramchandrachariar and ;K.V. Ramachandra Iyer, Advs.
DispositionAppeal allowed
Cases ReferredCannanore Bank Ltd. v. Madhavi
Excerpt:
.....by the district collector which does not take in a dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it is not pressed. 648, in support of his contention that his client may well be regarded as a person aggrieved. i am not satisfied that the ruling has any application to the present case......their learned counsel, mr. g. chandrasekhara sastri, is that the plaintiff can not be said to be a person aggrieved, and that the district collector cannot be said to have decided the appeal, as these two words 'aggrieved' and 'decided' used in the proviso to sub-clause (ii) |of clause (d) to sub-section (2) of section 44-b of the act ought to be understood. says the learned counsel, the plaintiff chose not to press the appeal to the district collector which did not therefore go to a decision. that was a step which he took of his own free volition. the district collector could not and did not therefore decide the appeal. there was no need for him in fact and in truth to go into the merits. so asks the learned counsel, low on earth can it be said that the plaintiff is a person aggrieved.....
Judgment:

Raghava Rao, J.

1. Within six months of an order of the District Collector dismissing as with-drawn an appeal preferred by the respondent before me against an order of the Collector acting under Section 44 B, Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act holding that the inam in question consisted only of the melwaram, the respondent filed the suit out of which this second appeal arises for a declaration that the inam constituted of both the melwaram and the kudiwaram. The appellant before me as defendants in the suit contended inter alia as follows in paragraph (6) of their written statement:

'The plaintiff filed an appeal before the District. Col' lector, Coimbatore, but did not press the appeal. Therefore there was no judicial order by the District Collector on the appeal petition as contemplated by Section 44-B (2) (d) (ii) of the said Act find the plaintiff had no reasons to be aggrieved and therefore, the suit is barred by limitation since he cannot rely on the order of the District Collector. The cause of action alleged is not correct. The plaintiff is not entitled to the remedy by way of suit and is clearly out of time.'

The suit was decreed in the Courts below.

2. The short and neat point taken for the appellants by their learned counsel, Mr. G. Chandrasekhara Sastri, is that the plaintiff can not be said to be a person aggrieved, and that the District Collector cannot be said to have decided the appeal, as these two words 'aggrieved' and 'decided' used in the proviso to Sub-clause (ii) |of clause (d) to Sub-section (2) of Section 44-B of the Act ought to be understood. Says the learned counsel, the plaintiff chose not to press the appeal to the District Collector which did not therefore go to a decision. That was a step which he took of his own free volition. The District Collector could not and did not therefore decide the appeal. There was no need for him in fact and in truth to go into the merits. So asks the learned counsel, low on earth can it be said that the plaintiff is a person aggrieved when the order of which he is complaining is an order of his own solicitation procured by him on an express invitation made by himself to the District Collector not to deal with the appeal but to dismiss it? Learned counsel is, in my opinion, perfectly right. The meaning of the word 'aggrieved' as given in the Oxford English Dictionary is 'injuriously affected by the action of any one', and no one can ordinarily be allowed to complain of an act of his own doing. The word 'decided' prima facie imports a decision on the merits, and its use in the relevant section of the relevant Act certainly excludes, at any rate, an order of the kind that we have before us.

3. Mr. Ramabhadrachariar for the respondent has in his usual forceful and resourceful argument sought to surmount this obstacle in his way but not with success. He suggested first that in this form the contention was not raised in the Courts below. He conceded however fairly and frankly that the written statement does raise the contention in this very form. Issue 2 was undobtedly intended to cover the point, and although the point does not seem to have been raised in the memorandum of first appeal or argued before the lower appellate Court it cannot be treated as abandoned. The appellant's learned counsel is entitled therefore to raise it and I am entitled to entertain it here. It was next submitted by Mr. Ramabhadrachariar on the analogy of a Bench ruling of this Court in Cannanore Bank Ltd. v. Madhavi, I. L. R. (1942) Mad. 336: A. I. R. 1942 Mad. 41 that if a per-son getting his claim petition dismissed as not pressed would be regarded as a person against whom an order is made within the language of Order 21 Rule 63, Civil P. C., there is no reason why the plaintiff should not be treated as a person aggrieved within the language of the relevant provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act referred to above. Assuming the analogy to be otherwise well founded, it fails certainly for the reason that the order under the relevant provisions of the Act must be an order in an appeal decided by the District Collector which does not take in a dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it is not pressed. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on the authority of Ex-parte Poulton and Son; In re Copyright Acts, (1884) 53 L. J. Q B. 320: 32 W. R. 648, in support of his contention that his client may well be regarded as a person aggrieved. I am not satisfied that the ruling has any application to the present case. There, under 5 and 6 Victoria 45, Section 14, which gives power to make an order to vary an entry in the register of copyright under that Act upon the application of any person who shall deem himself aggrieved by any 'such entry'; the Court made an order varying an entry in a register of copyright upon the application of the person who had caused the entry to be made. Any person 'who shall deem himself aggrieved by any entry in the register of copyright' is entitled under the statute there in question to apply, whereas under the statutory provisions with which we are concerned here the person entitled to sue is a person aggrieved, i. e., actually aggrieved, not a person who merely shall deem himself aggrieved.

4. For the reasons indicated, in the foregoing, the suit is not maintainable, and the second appeal must therefore be allowed but in the circumstances without costs right through,

5. No leave.


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