1. It is not quite clear from the judgment of the learned District Judge whether he considered the question whether the plaintiff's predecessors in title were in possession of the two links of the pial in dispute before the plaintiff obtained his conveyance. The District Judge observes that the plaintiff's possession was proved to date only from 1906. He says also : 'plaintiff's possession is evidently not such as to throw the burden of proof on the other side' i.e., apparently, that possession for 2 years is not suffaient to shift the onus.
2. We may also observe that, when possession for a certain period is shown, it will be open to a court deciding the facts to presume that possession prior to that period was also in the party whose subsequent possession is proved. See Venkatarama Iyer v. The Secretary of State for India, in Council I.L.R. (1910) M 362.
3. We request the lower appellate Court to record a revised finding on the evidence on record on the question of possession of the two links of the pial and the seven links of the brick alodi. He will also record a finding on the 2nd issue. The findings will be submitted within one month from the date of the receipt of this order. Seven days will be allowed for objections.
In compliance with the order contained in the above judgment the District Judge of Tanjore submitted the following findings:--Ed.
My finding on the question of possession, therefore, is that the plaintiff and his predecessors-in-title have been in possession of the 2 links of pial and the 7 links of alodi for a period of 30 years and more.
As regards the question of limitation, I think the suit is clearly time-barred by Section 14 of Act III of 1905 (Madras). The suit is not one for a declaration of title to the disputed site, but one for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession of the site by taking action against him under Act III of 1905 and for the recovery of the penal assessment already levied from him under that Act. Both these causes of action clearly come within the scope of Section 14 of Act III of 05 and are governed by the rule of limitation therein laid down. In the plaint the plaintiff himself has given the dates of his causes of action as 27th November 1907, the date on which the defendant served him with notice to vacate the disputed sites and 18th January 1908, the date on which penal assessment was collected from him in respect of the alleged encroachment. Clearly those are the dates on which the two causes of action arose and the plaintiffs' suit was therefore time-barred in respect of both the reliefs prayed for by him on the date on which he presented his plaint to the District Munsiff's Court, i.e., 28--9--01. My finding on the second issue is therefore that the suit is barred by limitation.