Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.
1. The appellant was a member of the Valavali Agraharam Co-operative Society, which is now in liquidation. He was indebted to the Society and the liquidator passed an order against him under Section 47 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932. This entitled the liquidator to proceed in execution in accordance with the rules framed under the Act. The liquidator applied to the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies to execute the order requiring payment by bringing to sale properties belonging to the appellant. After the properties had been sold the appellant filed an application before the Deputy Registrar for an order setting aside the sale on the ground that there' had been material irregularity and fraud in connection with the proclamation and conduct of the sale. This application was rejected. The appellant then appealed to the Registrar, who confirmed the order of the Deputy Registrar dismissing the plaintiff's objections to the sale. Thereupon the appellant filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Chittoor for a decree declaring that the sale was fraudulent and that all the proceedings in execution were vitiated by material irregularities. The Subordinate Judge held that the suit did not lie as the Co-operative Societies Act and the rules framed thereunder had the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The appeal is against the decree dismissing the suit.
2. The rules framed under the Act provide the procedure to be adopted in matters of execution of orders passed under the Act. They embody broadly the provisions of Order 21, rules 89, 90, 92, 93 and 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but Sub-rule (3) of Rule 92, which says that no suit to set aside an order made under the rule shall be brought by a person against whom the order is made, finds no counterpart in the rules framed under the Act. The rules certainly provide ample machinery for the execution of orders and for the hearing and determination of objections to sales in execution.
3. In deciding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted the learned Subordinate Judge relied on the judgment of Wadsworth, J., in Subbayya v. Thippa Reddi : AIR1939Mad967 , where the facts were very similar to the facts in the present case except that no application for an order setting aside the order in execution was filed. The learned Judge held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was ousted by reason of the fact that special machinery had been provided by statute for the execution of such orders. This judgment was approved of by the Full Bench of this Court which decided Secretary of State for India v. Jagannadham (1941) M.L.J. 47 : I.L.R. (1941) Mad. 850 .
4. It is not necessary that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts should be expressly excluded. The exclusion can be implied. Where we have, as we have here, the same machinery for the execution of orders and the hearing of objections to sales in execution under the Act as are to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure, the only reasonable conclusion is that the Legislature intended the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to be removed. Moreover, the Registrar is given extraordinary powers. For instance, by reason of Rule 22(10)(in) he can set aside a sale notwithstanding that no application has been made in that behalf or on grounds other than those alleged in an application which has been made and rejected. Under Clause (vi) of Sub-rule (10) a right of appeal is given provided it is brought within one year from an order passed by the Deputy Registrar. Section 57 of the Act gives the Provincial Government full powers of revision.
5. The matter does not even rest there. Section 48 of the Co-operative Societies Act says that save in so far as is expressly provided by the Act no Civil Court shall take cognizance of a matter connected with the winding up or dissolution of a Society under the Act. The order which was passed against the plaintiff was an order passed in connection with the liquidation of the Society of which he was a member. It was found to be necessary to wind up the Society and therefore all persons who owed money to it were called upon to pay. We think that Section 48 can in such a case as this be read as an express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.
6. For these reasons we hold that the Subordinate Judge was right. Accordingly we dismiss the appeal with costs; one set to the second respondent and one set to the first and fourth respondents. As the appellant has appealed in forma pauperis he must pay the required court-fee to Government.