1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by a reversioner to recover possession of the properties alienated by the, widows of the last male owner. The second of the widows died in 1897 when the cause of action for the present suit accrued (vide article 141 of the Limitation Act). The present suit was filed on 31-3-1919. The court below held that the suit was barred by limitation. It appears that one Narayana Rao whose heir the present plaintiff is and who was the reversioner on the date of the death of the widow had during the lifetime of the widow filed a suit for setting aside the alienations and in that suit it was held that the suit was not maintainable because it appeared that he was not the nearest heir but another namely one Balusami Pandithar. In 1909 Baluswami Pandithar filed a suit O.S. No. 3 of 1909 for recovering possession of the properties, but it was found that he was not a reversioner at all as his title rested on an alleged adoption which was found not to be true in the case. This decision was given in 1916.
2. It is now contended before us that neither Narayana Rao nor the plaintiff could file a suit for possession prior to 1916 when it was found that Baluswami was not a reversioner at all and that therefore it must be considered that the present plaintiff had a fresh cause of action in 1916. In support of the appellant's contention the following cases are relied on. Mussumat Ranee Surno Moyee v. Ghooshee Mokhee Burmonia (1868) 12 M.L.A. 244 followed in Mnthuveerappp Chetty v. Adaikappa Chetly : (1920)39MLJ312 , Karter Singh v. Bhagat Singh 64 I.C. 454, Lakhan Chunder Sen v. Madhusudan Sen I.L.R. (1907) Cal 209 , affirmed by the Privy Council in Nrityamoni Dasi v. Lakhan Chandra Sen I.L.R. (1918) Cal 660, and explained in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar (1921) 42 M.L.J 303. In each of these cases it appears that the right of the plaintiff was at one time satisfied but afterwards on account of some other proceeding, the satisfaction was cancelled and he was relegated back to his original rights and he had to bring a suit in which it was held that there was a suspension of the cause of action during the period during which his rights were satisfied or that a fresh cause of action accrued to the plaintiff. It is unnecessary to consider these decisions, for, in the present case it cannot be said that at any time the plaintiff's right was satisfied and that on account of the annulment of the satisfaction, a fresh cause of action arose. These cases therefore cannot help the appellant. Another case relied on by the appellant is Hemendra Mohonkhasnobis v. Dharamnath Chandra Roy (1921) 25 C. W. N. 376 . The facts as stated in the report are not quite intelligible but it is clear that in that case, the expression of opinion in the suit of the second mortgagee was for some reason considered to have modified the decree in the suit of the then mortgagee. The facts are intelligible only on such a footing. Therefore this case does not help the appellant. The last case relied on is Maharajah of Dharbhanga v. Homeshvar Singh (1922) 30 M.L.T. 189, That case turned upon when the right to apply for execution under article 181 first accrued and cannot help the appellants. The decision in Soni Ram v. Kanhaiya Lal 25 M.L.J. 131 (P.C.) is an authority for the proposition that limitation when it once begins to run cannot stop running except in the particular exception mentioned in Section 9 of the Limitation Act, This view was also adopted in this Court by a Full Bench of three Judges in a Letters Patent Appeal reported in Secretary of State for India v. Zamindarni Vegayam-mapetta Estate (1921) 59 I.C. 98 . It is not even clear that the plaintiff could not bring a suit until the judgment of 1916 was delivered. If the plaintiff concedes that the decision in O.S. No. 56 of 1894 is res judicata against him so far as the defendants who were parties to the suit are concerned this present suit is barred by res judicata in addition to limitation. But if that suit is not res-judicata against the present plaintiff then his contention that he could not bring a suit until 1916 cannot be sustainable and therefore the reason he gives for his inability to sue until 1916 cannot be accepted. In every possible view, the suit is barred.
3. The appeal is dismissed with costs. The costs (one set) will be proportionate to the interest of the respondents.