Venkatasubba Rao, J.
1. The question that arises is, whether a party's initials are equivalent to his signature under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, which says that an acknowledgment of liability in respect of property or right should be made in writing, signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed. On principle there seems to be no reason for holding that the word ' signed' should be construed as meaning ' signed in full '. The object of the Act, as I understand it, is to regard as sufficient what the writer intends to be equivalent to his signature, the form being immaterial so long as it verifies the acknowledgment. To ignore the substance and attach importance to the form, would be to defeat the plain intention of the Statute, which makes no distinction between ' signing ' and ' signing in full '. The word ' initial', according to the Oxford Dictionary, means ' sign with initials '. The question arose under the Indian Succession Act, which enacts that each of the witnesses to the will must sign it, whether a person who affixes his initials in place of his full signature, sufficiently complies with the Act. Wilkinson, J., sitting on the Original Side of the High Court and Collins, C.J., and Handley, on appeal from his judgment, held that a witness's initials amounted to a signature within the Act. Ammayee v. Yalumalai I.L.R.(1892) 15 Mad. 261. The learned Appellate Judges say:
The Act does not provide that the attesting witnesses should sign in full and we know of no authority for the proposition that initials are not signature.
2. Then follows a sentence which no doubt is obiter but to which I attach great importance:
On the contrary it has been held that they are equivalent lo a signature to an acknowledgment under the Limitation Act.
3. True, no authority is quoted, but that only shows that the matter was too firmly settled to be open to argument.
4. Lakshmanacharyulu v. Venkataramanujacharyulu : AIR1926Mad827 , where it is said that Odgers, J., took a contrary view, has been cited; but the learned Judge qualifies his statement in such a manner as to make the case not valuable as a precedent. There is a passing reference to this case in the judgment of Sundaram Chetty, J., in Velivalli Brahmaiah, In re : (1930)59MLJ674 but the question there was, whether the affixing of his initials by a Magistrate satisfied the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Code, which uses the word 'sign'. The Code of Criminal Procedure is scarcely in pari materia with the Limitation Act and I am not prepared to regard this case as an authority on the point with which I have now to deal. The Lower Court's view therefore is perfectly right, being in accord both with principle and authority.
5. The objection taken as to the allowing of compound interest is untenable and must be disallowed.
6. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition fails and is dismissed with costs.