Nainar Sundaram, J.
1. An extent of 30 acres was the subject-matter of the deed of trust, dated October 21, 1959. From a reading of the copy of the document furnished, it is clear that the said extent had come to vest in the trustee, who is none else than the author of the trust and who must hold the lands and utilise the income therefrom for the purposes specified in the said deed. Subsequently under the deed, dated April 1, 1969, an extent of ac. 14.38 out of 30 acres was taken and was endowed to and in favour of the petitioner-school in these writ petitions. The petitioner-school is an autonomous body and has got a governing body of its own for its administration. What has been done in this case by the authorities concerned is, to club the two extents, viz., the extent of ac. 15.62 left over under the earlier deed of October 21, 1959, and the extent of ac. 14.38 endowed under the subsequent deed dated April 1, 1969, and pass the orders of assessment under the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955 (Act 5 of 1955), hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'.
2. On a perusal of the two deeds in question, it cannot be held that the trustee under the deed of 1959 and the school under the deed of 1969 are one and the same person so as to warrant clubbing of the two extents for the purposes of assessment under the Act. Section 3(1) of the Act speaks of charge of agrl. income-tax on the total agrl. income of the previous year of every person. The expression 'person' has been defined under s. 2(q) of the Act. So also the expression 'to hold' has been defined under s. 2(nn) of the Act. A reading of these provisions clearly conveys to one's mind that there could be holdings by different persons and unless the holdings are by one and the same person, there is no warrant for clubbing the holdings for the purposes of assessment under the Act. In Mariam Aysha v. Commr. of Agrl. I.T. : 104ITR381(Mad) , Ramaprasada Rao J., as he then was, had clearly pointed our that the lands held by an individual in his capacity as a normal person would be severed from the lands held by him in his other capacity an would be dealt with accordingly and the authority under the Act normally have no jurisdiction to club holdings of persons who have a different status in the eye of law and who fill in different legal personalities in any one individual. In the present case, the petitioner-school is found to be a different and separate entity from the trustee, who holds the residual extent under the deed of 1959. Hence, the clubbing is without jurisdiction, and in this view, I am obliged to interfere in writ proceedings. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed. There will be no order as to costs.