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Karuppanna Tevar Vs. Angammal and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1926Mad678; (1926)51MLJ67
AppellantKaruppanna Tevar
RespondentAngammal and ors.
Cases ReferredDodda Sannekappa v. Sakravva
Excerpt:
- - the court may hold that the alienation impeached is good, but if it comes to the conclusion that the widow has been guilty of the other acts alleged, it may appoint a receiver......'to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed.' does the second relief follow as a consequence from the first? i must now turn to the plaint to examine the allegations made in this respect. the plaintiff first states that the widow made a certain alienation and he impeaches it. he then proceeds to say that the widow has been wasting the estate in the following manner: by allowing debts to become barred by limitation, by making gifts of certain items of property and by executing fraudulent receipts in respect of payments not really made to her. for the purpose of ascertaining the court-fee payable we must have regard to the allegations in the plaint. whether they have or have not been denied in the written statement, is not a matter which signifies. in.....
Judgment:

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

1. The question to be decided in this case is, what is the Court-fee payable? Is Section 7(4)(c) of the Court Fees Act or Article 17(b) of Scheduel II applicable? The plaintiff who claims to be the reversionary heir of. a certain deceased Hindu has filed the suit questioning an alienation made by the 1st defendant, the latter's widow, and making various charges regarding alleged waste by her of the property. The plaintiff asks substantially for two reliefs (1) for a declaration that an alienation specifically mentioned in the plaint is not binding upon him, and (2) for the appointment of a Receiver to take possession of the estate from the widow and manage it during her lifetime. The short question to be decided is, is the relief for the appointment of a Receiver a 'consequential relief' within the meaning of Section 7(4)(c)? The words used in that section arc 'to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed.' Does the second relief follow as a consequence from the first? I must now turn to the plaint to examine the allegations made in this respect. The plaintiff first states that the widow made a certain alienation and he impeaches it. He then proceeds to say that the widow has been wasting the estate in the following manner: by allowing debts to become barred by limitation, by making gifts of certain items of property and by executing fraudulent receipts in respect of payments not really made to her. For the purpose of ascertaining the Court-fee payable we must have regard to the allegations in the plaint. Whether they have or have not been denied in the written statement, is not a matter which signifies. In order to determine whether the first relief is consequential upon the second, let me see how the position stands. Supposing the first relief is not granted, does it follow that the plaintiff cannot obtain the second relief? The Court may hold that the alienation impeached is good, but if it comes to the conclusion that the widow has been guilty of the other acts alleged, it may appoint a Receiver. Then again take the converse case. Supposing the Court comes to the conclusion that the alienation is not binding on the estate, does it follow that the second relief will be granted? It clearly does not, because the Court may find that the particular alienation is bad but that there has not been such waste as to justify the appointment of a Receiver. As a matter of fact, there is no necessary connection between the two reliefs. It is quite conceivable of course that the plaint may be so drafted that both the reliefs may be claimed on the strength of the same set of facts. In that case the second relief may properly be said to be consequential upon the first. In the present case, however, the facts are entirely different and as I have shown the two reliefs asked for are independent of each other. No case binding upon me which takes a different view has been cited and I hold that the proper Court-fee is the aggregate of two sums of Rs. 100 made up thus:

1. Under Scheduel i, Clause 17(a) 1, Rs. 100 for declaration, and

2. Under Scheduel 11, Clause 17(b), Rs. 100 for Receiver. The plaintiff has paid Rs. 200 and I declare that the proper Court-fee has been paid upon the plaint.

2. A preliminary objection has been taken that the order before me is in the nature of an interlocutory order and no revision petition will therefore lie. This contention is unsound, and this Court has often (and I have myself) interfered in revision with orders of this kind. If authority is needed I may refer to Ramrup Das v. Mohunt Shiyaram Das (1910) 14 C.W.N. 932 and on this point I am prepared to follow also the decision in Dodda Sannekappa v. Sakravva (1916) 36 I.C. 831 .

3. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed with costs.


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