1. The appellant brought a suit for recovery of the suit lands and for rent against a tenant and valued his suit for purposes of jurisdiction according to the market value of the land in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Madras Civil Courts Act (III of 1873) and Section 7(v)(d) of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870). He accordingly presented the plaint before the Subordinate Judge, but it was returned for presentation before the District Munsif on the ground that if valued under the provisions of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, the value of the suit would be below Rs. 2,500 and the question has now come up in Letters Patent Appeal as to which provision of law should be applied in valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction.
2. The Court Fees Act was amended by Act VI of 1905 and a new category of suits was added to Section 7 of the Court Fees Act as Clause (xi)(cc), i.e., for the recovery of immoveable property from a tenant. Undoubtedly the present suit comas under this category and the effect of the amendment is to remove such a suit from Section 7, Clause (v) to Section 7, Clause (xi) of the. Court Fees Act. All suits falling under Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act, are excluded from the provisions of Section 8 of Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887) which provides that the valuation of suits for the computation of Court fees shall be the same as for purposes of jurisdiction. The suits excluded from the provisions of Section 8 are those falling under Section 7, Clauses (v), (vi), (ix) and (x)(d) of the Court Fees Act, and until the passing of Act VI of 1905 a suit for the recovery of immoveable property from a tenant would not have been valued in accordance with Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, but in accordance with Section 14 of the Civil Courts Act. Section 14 has not been expressly repealed and the only question we have to determine now is whether it has been impliedly repealed by Act VI of 1905 in respect of suits under Section 7(xi)(cc). This latter Act is only an amendment of the Court Fees Act, and only incidentally affects the Suits Valuation Act by creating a new category of suits falling under Section 8 of that Act, and impliedly removing such suits from the provisions of Section 14 of the Madras Civil Courts Act. In the Suits Valuation Act it is expressly laid down in Section 6 that when rules are framed under Section 3, Section 14 of the Civil Courts Act shall be repealed. From this it is obvious that the Suits Valuation Act when passed was not intended to repeal Section 14 until a certain event happened and that event has not happened, but by enacting Act VI of 1905 the legislature has not only amended the Court Fees Act, but has incidentally withdrawn a certain class of suits, the one under consideration, from the provisions of Section 14, Civil Courts Act, and added it to those falling under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. Whether the legislature intended Act VI of 1905 to have this effect or not, it is clear that the effect has been caused, and consequently the law must be deemed to have been changed by the later enactment. The fact that the Civil Courts Act is an Act applicable only to the Presidency of Fort St. George whereas the amending Act applies to the whole of India, does not in my opinion affect the question, for the greater contains the leas, and the law laid down in the amending Act is applicable to Madras as well as to other parts of India. The ruling in Chalasamy Ramiah v. Chalasamy Ramasami (1912) 11 M.L.T. 155 has very little bearing on this case, for it does not deal with Section 7, Clause (xi)(cc), and all that can he said is that some of the observations in the judgment to a certain extent support appellant's line of argument. The ruling in Nandan Singh v. Debi Din (1914) 12 A.L.J. 933 is, if anything against him. I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.
3. Letters Patent Appeal No. 276 follows.
Sadasiva Ayyar, J.
4. I concur in dismissing the appeals with costs.