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Kelu Manikaran Vs. Pakarvoor Manakal Jatavedan Nambudripad's L.R. Narayanan Somayajipad and Anr. (21.01.1910 - MADHC) - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported in(1911)21MLJ465
AppellantKelu Manikaran
RespondentPakarvoor Manakal Jatavedan Nambudripad's L.R. Narayanan Somayajipad and Anr.
Cases ReferredVenkatachellam Chetty v. Veerappa Pillai I. L. R.
Excerpt:
- - the terms of the 1st clause of this section clearly refer to cases where a party is restrained from doing an act and the operation of that clause is not limited to the cases contemplated by the second clause......terms of the decree. the terms of the 1st clause of this section clearly refer to cases where a party is restrained from doing an act and the operation of that clause is not limited to the cases contemplated by the second clause. that the matter is one arising in the execution of a decree there can be no doubt. that the section refers to cases where a party is directed to carry out something is conceded. no reason is suggested why those cases where a party is directed to abstain from doing an act should be placed on a different footing, and the words of the clause are wide enough to include such cases, and we therefore hold that section 260 applies to the present case. the same view was taken in venkatachellam chetty v. veerappa pillai i. l. r. (1905) m. 314. the question whether the.....
Judgment:

1. The appellant was restrained by a decree from taking water which the respondents carry through a thodu. He has now put up a dam and carried the water to his fields against the terms of the decree, with the result that the 1st respondent has sustained damages estimated at about Rs. 300 by the lower court. Under Section 260 of the C.P.C. the appellant's property has been ordered to be placed under attachment for the satisfaction of the amount. It is conceded that if Section 260 applies this appeal fails, but it is contended that the section does not apply, as the 2nd clause shows that it contemplates only cases where the judgment-debtor may carry out the terms of the decree within the period of one year the property is to remain under attachment before it is sold and does not therefore apply to this and similar cases where the judgment-debtor is restrained from doing an act, and he has already violated the terms of the decree.

2. We are unable to agree with that contention. In the present case he continues to violate the terms of the decree. The terms of the 1st clause of this section clearly refer to cases where a party is restrained from doing an act and the operation of that clause is not limited to the cases contemplated by the second clause. That the matter is one arising in the execution of a decree there can be no doubt. That the section refers to cases where a party is directed to carry out something is conceded. No reason is suggested why those cases where a party is directed to abstain from doing an act should be placed on a different footing, and the words of the clause are wide enough to include such cases, and we therefore hold that Section 260 applies to the present case. The same view was taken in Venkatachellam Chetty v. Veerappa Pillai I. L. R. (1905) M. 314. The question whether the plaintiff is an assignee has already been decided by this court. The objection that the representatives of a deceased decree holder are not parties was not raised in the court of 1st instance. The appeal is dismissed with costs.


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