1. The learned District Judge has reversed the decision of the District Munsiff who granted a decree for money against the 1st defendant personally. The District Judge held that the suit of the plaintiff (the vendee) so far as it prayed for recovery of compensation from the 1st defendant (the vendor) for the breach of the covenants for title and possession was barred by limitation, the 'period being three years under Article 62 or 97 of the Limitation Act. The learned District Judge relied on Kovuri Basivi Beddi v. Tallapragada Nagamma I.L.R. (1910) M. 39 in support of his decision.
2. It is contended before us that as the sale-deed in this case was executed in 1904 long after the Transfer of Property Act came into force, the proper article to be applied in respect of a suit claiming compensation for breach of an express or implied covenant of title and quiet enjoyment is Article 116 which allows a period of six years. We think that this contention must be upheld. It has been decided in a series of cases beginning from 1889 (See the two cases reported in Kasturi Naicken v. Venkatasubba Mudali (1889) I M.L.J. 162 and Narayana Reddi v. Padarama Reddi (1891) 1 M.L.J. 479 that in all registered conveyances executed after the Transfer of Property Act come into force, a covenant for title is implied by Section 55 Clause 2 of that Act, that the registered conveyance should be read as if it expressly embodied that covenant and that the breach of that covenant is the breach of a contract in writing registered within the meaning of Article 116.
3. We need refer only to a few of the later cases namely those in Chidambaram Pillai v. Swethasami Thevar (1904) 15 M.L.J. 396 The Zamindar of Vizianagaram v. Behara Surya Narayana Pantalu I.L.R. (1901) M. 587 Nageswara Row) v. Sambasiva Row (1911) M.W.N. 361 Kirshnan Nambiar v. Kannen I.L.R. (1897) M. 8 and Unichaman v. Ahmed Kuthi Kyai I.L.R. (1897) M. 242. It must however be admitted that the case in Kovvuri Basivi Reddi v. Tallapragada Nagamma I.L.R. (1910) M. 39 seems to throw some doubt on the decision in Krishnan Nambiar v. Kantian I.L.R. (1897) M. 8 which follows the current of the earlier decisions. The reasoning in Kovvur Basivi Reddi v. Tallapragada Nagamma I.L.R. (1910) M. 39 is not quite clear and one of the two learned Judges who took part in it was also a party to the later decision which expressly followed the current pf the earlier decisions (see the subsequent case reported in Nageswara Row v. Sambasiva Row (1911) M.W.N. 361 distinguishing the case in Kovvuri Basivi Raddi v. Tallapragada Nagamma I.L.R. (1910) M. 39 as ' not in point.') In Kovvuri Basivi Reddi v. Tallapragada Nagamma I.L.R. (1910) M. 39 the correctness of the decision in Krishnan Nambiar v. Kannan I.L.R. (1897) M. 8 was doubted on the strength of the Privy Council ruling in Hanumankamat v. Hanuman Mandur (1891) I.L.R. 19 C. 123 (P.C.) wherein their Lordships held that in the case of a conveyance executed in 1879 (before the Transfer of Property Act came into force) a suit for compensation for failure of consideration (that is, for the recovery of the purchase money paid to the vendor) through the failure of the vendee to obtain possession of the land sold fell under Article 97(3 years rule) that the date of the cause of action was the date of the obstruction by the vendor's co-parceners. Their Lordships had no occasion to consider the effect of Section 55, Clause (2) of the Transfer of Property Act on a registered conveyance executed after the date of that Act. That case is therefore not an authority for the proposition that to a suit brought on the covenant added by the statute law to all registered conveyances executed after the Transfer of Property Act came into force Article 116 did not apply but only Article 62 or 97. In Unichamari v. Ahmed Kuthihkayi I.L.R. (1807) M. 242 a similar argument was addressed to a Bench of this Court namely that Article 97 applied to such a suit because the Bombay High Court held that view in Sawaba Khandapa v. Apaji Jotirow I.L.R. (1887) B. 475. But as a Division Bench of this Court point out in Unichaman v. Ahmed Kuthihkayi I.L.R. (1807) M. 242 the Transfer of Property Act was not in force in Bombay when that decision in Sawaba Khandapa v. Abaji Jotirow I.L.R. (1887) B. 475 was given. This distinction seems not to have been in the minds of the learned Judges who decided I.L.R. 35 M. 39. We might add that Benson J, who took part in I.L.R. 35 M. 39 was also a party to the prior case in I.L.R. 21 M. 242. Next it was contended that Bakewell J. doubted the correctness of I.L.R. 21 M. 8 in his judgment in Ramanatha Aiyar v. Ozahoor Pathiriseri Raman Nambudri (1913) M.W.N. 1029. In the first place the observation is obiter. In the second place (with the greatest respect) we find difficulty in following the observation of the learned Judge that the Transfer of Property Act 'may be construed as having annexed the statutory agreement' (that is the contract embodying the covenant for title and other covenants) to the contractof sale and not to the deed of conveyance itself. As said in Dart's Vendors and Purchasers Vol. I. p. 567, these covenants are by the English Conveyancing Act 1881, Section 7 ' implied in every conveyance' and we do not see why they should be held under the Transfer of Property Act to be attached only to the contract of sale and not to the conveyance. The other learned Judge Miller J. was prepared to follow I.L.R. 21 M. 8. The Respondent's Vakil's argument that a covenant for title cannot be implied where the buyer knows the defect of title is opposed to the recent decision by Seshagiri Aiyar J. in Bubbaraya Redaiar v. Rajagopala Reddiar (1914) M.W.N. 376 with which decision we agree.
4. The learned District Judge has decided the case only on the preliminary ground of limitation raised in the 9th ground of the appeal memorandum presented to the District Judge. We are unable to agree with him in that finding and if Article 116 applies, as we hold it to apply it is not denied that the suit is not barred. The question whether plaintiff can be given a decree for recovery of the money due under the original hypothecation bond has also not been decided (see Order 41, Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code and the wide powers of the Appellate Court).
5. We therefore reverse the District Judge's decision and remand the case for the disposal of the appeal preferred to the District Court on the other points arising in the case.
6. Costs will abide the result.