1. This is a revision against the Order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Ulundurpet in Crl. M.P. No. 251 of 1955. The application was made by the respondent under Section 87 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act for the issue of an order directing the delivery of the properties mentioned in the schedule therein to him from the petitioner. The lower Court has, in my opinion, very rightly passed the order directing the petitioner herein to deliver the properties to the respondent. It is against that order that this revision has been filed by the hereditary trustee, the petitioner herein. A preliminary objection was taken by the learned Counsel for the respondent, i.e., the trustee appointed by the Board, that this petition should not have been filed as a criminal revision petition and that the petition must be stamped with a Court-fee of Rs. 25 as the petition will lie under the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution. That preliminary objection is met by the learned Counsel for the petitioner who contends that a criminal revision petition would lie. Mr. Arunachalam Ayyar for the respondent relies on a decision, Mt. Mithan v. Municipal Board Orai : AIR1956All351 , in support of his contention that this is a special jurisdiction conferred upon the Magistrate, and the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code do not apply to this. As against this learned Counsel for the petitioner relies on a decision of this Court in Srinivasa Reddiar and Ors. v. Krishnaswami Reddiar : AIR1955Mad72 . A Bench of this Court consisting of my Lord the Chief Justice and Rajagopala Aiyangar, J., have held that the order passed in revisions like this should be deemed to be an order passed in the exercise of Criminal jurisdiction. This decision is binding on me and, therefore, I hold disagreeing with the contentions of the learned Counsel for the respondent, that this is a criminal revision petition and that the petition need not be stamped as contended for by the respondent. As regards the petition, the learned Counsel points out that the certificate that has been granted in this case has not been signed, but only contains a facsimile signature of the officer concerned. I have held in Krishnaswami Iyengar v. Veerappa Chetty : (1956)2MLJ4 , that a certificate referred to in Section 87 of the Act must be signed by the Commissioner and it is not sufficient if it bears merely a facsimile signature. It is not disputed that this certificate contains only the facsimile signature, and, therefore, the certificate has not been duly issued by the officer concerned. It is on this technical point alone that I set aside this petition. It is open to the respondent to obtain another duly signed certificate from the officer concerned and apply for the possession of the properties, and the Magistrate will pass then an order according to law. The present order is therefore set aside and the petition is allowed.