1. The appellant is a member of the Kilpatti Co-operative Society. The Society obtained a 'decision' against him in the court of the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies. This procedure took place by virtue of the rules made by Government under powers of Section 43(1) of the Co-operative Societies Act. The decision was sent to the Tahsildar for enforcement. This was in accordance with Rule 14(5) of the Statutory Rules, which says : - The decision shall be enforced in either of these ways:
(a) on a requisition to the Collector of the District or to any person authorised by him in this behalf made by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, all sums recoverable under the decision shall be recovered in the same manner as arrears of land revenue.
(b) On application to the Civil Court, having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the decision that Court shall enforce the decision as if it were a decree of the Court.
2. Admittedly, the Tahsildar was the Officer deputed to act in this behalf by the Collector. The decision of the Registrar was given on 19th July, 1926. The requisition was sent to the Tahsildar in June, 1927 and kept by him till May, 1929, when lie returned it. There was then another long interval until 23rd December, 1930, when application was made to the Court, that is to say, the Munsif's Court, to enforce the decision. Two points were taken in the lower Courts, and they were the principal subject of argument in this appeal. First, it was contended that the second application was misconceived, having regard to Order 21, Rule 16, Civil Procedure Code. Apparently, between the date of the obtaining of the decision and the date of the filing of the second application there had been a change of Presidents of the Society, the first President having died and been succeeded in that office by another. The argument was that there had consequently been a transfer by operation of law and that therefore application to execute should have been made to the Court which passed the decision i.e, the Registrar's Court. But I think that there is no substance in this point; firstly because the statutory rules give no power to the Registrar to enforce a decision and, secondly, because the proceedings were brought by the Society and in the name of the Society, acting through its President, and consequently, there was no question of the second President, whose name was transposed for that of the first President, being his legal representative.
3. A more substantial question raised in the appeal is whether the second application was out of time. It certainly was unless Article 182(5)(b) of the Limitation Act saves it. Both the lower Courts held that the bar was saved on the ground that the tahsildar was within that provision 'the proper Court for execution'.
4. In my opinion neither the Tahsildar, nor the Collector by whom he was authorised to act, was a Court. Reference may be made to the analogous provisions of Sections 68 and 71 of the Civil Procedure Code which enable decrees to be transmitted to a Collector for execution. Section 71 says that in such matter the Collector shall be deemed to act judicially. But it has been held in Bhagwan Das v. Suraj Prasad I.L.R.(1924) 47 All. 217 that this does not mean that the Collector is a Court. I follow this authority; and there being nothing in the Co-operative Societies Act rules to indicate that the Collector is to be deemed to be a Court, I hold that he is not a Court when he acts under Rule 14,(5)(a). It follows that the Tahsildar is equally not a Court.
5. The application was therefore barred, and this appeal must be allowed with costs throughout.