1. Two grounds are urged before us in support of the second appeal.
2. The first is that the memorandum of Second Appeal No. 675 of 1884 preferred by one of the three defendants was confined to that portion alone of the property comprised in the suit in which the defendant was interested, and that therefore the reversal of the lower Appellate Court's decree and the restoration of the decree of the Court of First instance by the High Court should be construed as limited only to such portion. This point was not taken in the lower Courts and we cannot allow it to be now set up, as it involves a question which cannot be determined without admitting additional evidence.
3. The second point urged is that the plaintiffs suit is barred by limitation, under Article 139 of the Limitation Act, as it was not brought within twelve years from 1885 when it is contended that the kuikanom lease granted in 1873 determined by efflux of the time limited by the lease. There is no time fixed in the lease, and we are not prepared to say that a kuikanom lease, in which no term is fixed, is determined on the expiration of twelve years from its date. The customary law of Malabar requires that a tenant under a kanom or kuikanom lease should not be redeemed or ejected until the expiration of twelve years from its date, but it does not determine the lease at the expiration of the twelve years.
4. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.