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In Re: Muthupalaniappa Chettiar - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported in(1943)2MLJ428
AppellantIn Re: Muthupalaniappa Chettiar
Excerpt:
- .....been raised in the trial court. the learned sub-divisional magistrate considered that the term ' sanitary convenience ' was sufficiently wide to include a latrine. as the point was not taken in the trial court, i see no sufficient reason for interfering with his finding.2. the second point is one of limitation, mr. narayanaswami iyer contending that as section 39(1) of the act does not contemplate any period within which the notice must be complied with, as in the case of section 39(2), the offence must be deemed to have been committed immediately the service of the notice is followed by disobedience. it seems obvious that the construction of a latrine or other type of sanitary convenience requires a certain amount of time and instantaneous compliance with a notice under section 39(1).....
Judgment:
ORDER

Byers, J.

1. Three points have been urged in seeking the admission of this revision petition. The first of them is that a 'latrine' does not come within the scope of Section 39(1) of the Madras Public Health Act. This point does not appear to have been raised in the trial Court. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate considered that the term ' sanitary convenience ' was sufficiently wide to include a latrine. As the point was not taken in the trial Court, I see no sufficient reason for interfering with his finding.

2. The second point is one of limitation, Mr. Narayanaswami Iyer contending that as Section 39(1) of the Act does not contemplate any period within which the notice must be complied with, as in the case of Section 39(2), the offence must be deemed to have been committed immediately the service of the notice is followed by disobedience. It seems obvious that the construction of a latrine or other type of sanitary convenience requires a certain amount of time and instantaneous compliance with a notice under Section 39(1) would be a physical impossibility. Consequently there is nothing irregular in fixing a time limit for the terms of the notice to be complied with. The effect of this is that the question of disobedience arises only after the expiry of the notice. The case was instituted within three months of the expiry of this period, but apart from this it is obvious that the disobedience is a continuing offence so that no question of limitation arises.

3. The third point urged is that the petitioner's elder brother is in Occupation of the property but Section 39(1) contemplates notice on the owner of the property and there has been no suggestion that the petitioner is not an undivided owner with his brother. Section 137(2) provides for service of a notice on one of several owners and there was nothing irregular in requiring the petitioner to effect the necessary construction although his brother may be in actual occupation of the property. There is no necessity for an interference in revision and the petition is ordered to be dismissed.


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