Abdur Rahim, J.
1. In this case, it has been found upon the evidence that the parties compounded their disputes out of Court. There were three cases which arose out of the disputes between the petitioner and the respondents. In the first of these cases, the petitioner was the accused and in the second case, which was a counter-case to the first, the petitioner was the complainant. In the third case, that is the one in question, the petitioner was the complainant. In the other two cases, the accused were convicted and sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment each, Then they appealed to the Joint Magistrate and while the appeals ware pending, the parties entered into an arrangement that all the disputes between them should be settled. The Joint Magistrate has found that the arrangement settling the disputes extended to the case which was then pending in the Sub-Magistrate's Court. As a result of the compromise these two appeals in the Appellate Court were compounded with the permission of the Court and the accused acquitted. When, however, the accused in the present case submitted a petition to the Sub-Magistrate saying that this case also was the subject of the compromise, the complainant who is the present petitioner resiled from his former position and denied the composition. The Sub-Magistrate found that as a matter of fact the present casa was not settled. The Appellate Court has however taken a different view and we have no doubt that this view so far as the finding of fact is concerned is correct. The question of law then arises whether the composition or arrangement which was arrived at outside the Sub-Magistrate's Court comes within the terms of Section 345, Criminal Procedure Code. Clause (6) of that section says: 'The composition of an offence under the section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused.' It does not say as to what should be the procedure if one of the parties after they settled their disputes outside the Court refused to abide by it when the case comes on afterwards for hearing. There is only one precedent which covers this case. It is Murray v. The Queen Empress I.L.R. (1894) Calc. 103. There the learned Judges held or rather assumed as if the matter admitted of no doubt that it was competent for the Court in which the charge was pending to take evidence as to whether there was in fact a composition outside the Court. In that case, there was a dispute whether if there was a composition, it was valid one or not, having regard to the allegation whether the complainants acted freely and understood what they were doing. The section itself does not throw much light on the question raised before us. I am however inclined to take the same view as was taken in Murray v. The Queen Empress I.L.R. (1894) Calc. 103, Criminal Procedure Code, lays down that certain offences, of which the offence of hurt is one, can be compounded by the parties and no leave of the Court is necessary for the purpose while of certain other offences such as grievous hurt, there can be no composition without the permission of the Court before which they are pending. Where the parties have actually composed their disputes in the four classes of cases it is not clear, on principle, why it should be necessary for the validity of composition that any petition should be presented by the parties admitting the fact or why any of the parties should afterwards be allowed to withdraw from it. The composition spoken of in Section 345 is in the nature of a contract though I do not think it requires monetary consideration. I may point out however that in this case there was some consideration because there were other cases between the parties then pending and if there was an arrangement, the consideration was that each party should refrain from pursuing the case or eases in which the other party was the accused. It is true that if a Court is bound to take cognizance of a composition arrived at outside the Court but which has been resiled from by one of the parties when the case came to be tried, the Court will be obliged to take evidence and that will necessarily result in the prolongation of proceedings. But if the legislature contemplated that a composition should be made in Court or that a composition arrived at would not be considered to be complete until both parties have expressed their assent in Court whether by means of a petition or otherwise, one would expect that they would have said so. In the absence of any such express provision, the natural interpretation is that the composition is not limited to acts done in Court nor to cases in which the parties continue to be of the same mind until the case comes on for further bearing before the Court.
2. I would hold that there was a valid composition in this case and it had the effect of acquittal.
3. The abstract question as to the effect of an agreement to compound come to by the parties out of Court from which one subsequently resiles is a somewhat difficult one on which my mind is not free from doubt. The wording of Section 345, Criminal Procedure Code, throws little, if any, light on it and I should be loth to express a final opinion on the somewhat one sided argument that has been addressed to us. The only authority quoted certainly supports the view contended for by Mr. Ranga Achariyar. But on the facts found by the Joint Magistrate, I am clearly of opinion that the case is one in which in the exercise of our discretion we may very properly decline to interfere. I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother.