Govinda Menon, J.
1. This is an appeal under Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act against the order of the learned District Judge of Rajahmundry appointing the appellant herein guardian of his minor brother and directing the delivery of possession of the family properties to him on certain conditions imposed upon by the learned District Judge. The order was that it was only on the fulfilment of those conditions by the petitioner that he is entitled to recover possession of the properties, or to act as the guardian of his minor brother. The learned Judge held that as the elder brother has furnished security as ordered, he was to be appointed as guardian of the property of the minor on usual conditions. O. P. No. 92 of 1935 was an application for the appointment of a property guardian for the petitioner and his minor brother on the ground that both of them were minors and that a guardian should be appointed, because the joint family consisted only of these two minors and there was no adult major member at all. Accordingly, the respondent to this appeal Mr. Buchi Venkayya Pantulu, a legal practitioner, was appointed as guardian and he managed the estate of the petitioner and his minor brother. The petitioner became a major on the 15th October, 1945 and thereafter applied for recovery of possession of joint family properties under Section 39(a) and Section 41(2)(c) and Clause (3) of the Guardians and Wards Act. The learned Judge passed the order, which is the subject of appeal adverted to above.
2. It is clearly established that where all the members of a joint family are minors, the Court has power under the Guardians and Wards Act to appoint a guardian in case there are no adult male members. At page 299 of Mayne's Hindu Law (10th Edition), the learned author states as follows:
When all the coparceners of a Mitakshara joint family are minors, the Court can appoint a guardian of the property of the minors, though in such a case as soon as the eldest member of the family attains majority, the guardianship is ipso facto determined as regards all the members.
3. Bindaji v. Mathurabai I.L.R.(1905) Bom. 152, Ramachandra v. Krishna Rao I.L.R. (1908) Bom. 259. Shaminath Sahi v. Laljichaube I.L.R. (1913) All. 150. Jagannath Prasad v. Chunilal : AIR1933All180 . Chandrapal v. Sarabjit I.L.R. (1935) Luck. 67 are cited in support of this view. To the same effect are the statements of law in Mulla's Hindu Law, page 589, Section 519. It is stated there that if all the sons are minors, the Court may appoint a guardian for the whole of the joint property until one of them attains majority and the authority cited is Bindaji v. Mathurabai1 and Khikar Lakshmu v. Marudevi (I.L.R. 1908) Mad. 139. These decisions were considered and followed by this Court by Ramesam and Jackson, JJ., in C.M.A. No. 268 of 1928 where the learned Judges went further and said that if in addition to the minors there is an adult member, who on account of unsoundness of mind is incapable of managing the property, then a property guardian can be appointed for the minor's share. It is now well settled that a guardian cannot be appointed for the property of the minor members of a joint family. Sham Kuar v. Mohanunde Sahoy I.L.R. (1891) Cal. 301 Virupakshappa v. Nilgangava I.L.R. (1894) 19 Bom. 309 and the decision of the Privy Council in Garibulla v. Khalak Singh I.L.R. (1894) 19 Bom. 309 (P.C) authoritatively lay down the above proposition. Therefore the appointment of guardian was justified; but when once one of the minors becomes a major, he is ipso facto entitled to the resumption of the entire property in his favour and he could act as the natural guardian of the minor, not as the certificated guardian. That proposition is well settled by the statement of the law in Mayne's Hindu Law and the cases which have been quoted thereunder. Such being the case, the learned District Judge was wrong in directing the petitioner to furnish security before he recovered possession of the joint family properties. Probably the attention of the learned Judge was not specifically invited to the position of law, which is by this time very well settled. In these circumstances, the order of the lower Court being unsustainable cannot be maintained and is therefore set aside. The appeal is allowed and the appellant is entitled to get possession of the entire properties of the joint family without any conditions being attached whatever. As the respondent did not appear and as he himself is a legal practitioner; who has not objected to the surrender of possession of the property, we direct that the appellant do pay his costs in Court.