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Desayi Alias Allam Raju Nanjunadhiah Vs. Desayi Alias Allam Raju Venkatasubbiah - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectFamily
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported in(1914)27MLJ618
AppellantDesayi Alias Allam Raju Nanjunadhiah
RespondentDesayi Alias Allam Raju Venkatasubbiah
Cases ReferredMannu Lal v. Fazal Imam I.L.R.
Excerpt:
- .....the position of inam commissioner at one time. our conclusion is that in cases of partition of the land granted as inam among the members of the grantee's family, the pre-requisite of filing a certificate under the act has no application. this is supported by a large number of decided cases. panchanada v. neelakanda i.l.r. (1888) m 191 lays this down in distinct terms. it has been approved and followed in jeeyamba bai v. secretary of state for india : (1912)23mlj687 and the secretary of state v. subbarayadu i.l.r. (1912) m 559. the bombay high court in ravji narayan mandlik v. dadaji bapuji i.l.r. (1875) r 523 has taken the same view. mannu lal v. fazal imam i.l.r. (1911) a 580 is to the same effect. following these decisions we must hold that the courts below are right in deciding that.....
Judgment:

1. This second appeal is argued only with reference to items 56 to 58. The Courts below have held that plaintiff was entitled to a share in them. The 1st defendant's (Appellant's) contentions are twofold. He says that as the properties came to him from Thimma Raju who was the last holder of this Desai Inam the other members of his family can have no claim to them. It is found that at the time of the devolution, he was the manager of the undivided family of which plaintiff was a junior member. He must therefore be deemed to have taken the property for and on behalf of the joint family. The principle of the decision in Gunnaiyan v. Kamachi Ayyar I.L.R. (1902) M 339 applies to this case. We hold that the properties are not 1st. defendant's self acquisition. The more important question relates to the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain the suit without a certificate under the Pensions Act. The finding of the Courts below, we take to be, that the grant to Thimrna Raju's ancestors was of the land itself. There has been no suggestion that the original grantees had any Kudivaram right in the soil prior to the grant to them. These considerations have to be borne in mind in deciding whether the Pensions Act applies to this case. Section 4 interdicts the filing of suits relating to pensions, grant of land revenue or grant of money without a certificate. Whether grant of land is included in the term pension has been much debated. It is pointed out by Collins C.J. and Muthusami Aiyar J. in Rama v. Subba I.L.R. (1888) M 98 that the object of the enactment (The Pensions Act) was to prohibit parties from filing suits in Civil Courts in all cases of Inams, without the knowledge of the Government. The learned Judges inclined to the view that as the Government is entitled to the reversion, if they choose to exercise their right, the legislature has made it a condition precedent to the maintainability of these suits, that a certificate from them should be filed. These observations are of great value in considering the right of an alienee to recover possession of an Inam. When applied to a claim among the members of the family for partition, they have not the same significance. The learned Judges also observe at page 103, 'These decisions show that in order that a grant of villages may not fall under the Pensions Act, it must be a grant of the freehold therein or full ownership in the soil, qualified in no way by any reversion suggested by the terms of the grant in regard to future succession or transmission.' The import of this passage seems to be that if the grantee was possessed of the Kudivaram right at the time of the grant and all that the Government did was to transfer to him their right of land revenue, the Pensions Act will be a bar. It is true that where the Kudivaram has vested in the family and the Government conferred the Melwaram right later on, it is unlikely that the two rights should nave been kept separate. In the passage already quoted all that the learned Judges intended to lay down was that at the time of the suit, the Courts should apply their minds to the state of affairs which existed at the time of the grant. In the present case, as we prefaced, there is nothing to indicate that the grantees were the owners of the Kudivaram right and that the grant to them was only of the land revenue. The authorities to which we shall presently refer lay down that where there has been a grant of land, the Pensions Act is inapplicable. We have referred to Rama v. Subba I.L.R. (1888) M 98 at some length having regard to the fact that one of the learned Judges who took part in that decision held the position of Inam Commissioner at one time. Our conclusion is that in cases of partition of the land granted as Inam among the members of the grantee's family, the pre-requisite of filing a certificate under the Act has no application. This is supported by a large number of decided cases. Panchanada v. Neelakanda I.L.R. (1888) M 191 lays this down in distinct terms. It has been approved and followed in Jeeyamba Bai v. Secretary of State for India : (1912)23MLJ687 and the Secretary of State v. Subbarayadu I.L.R. (1912) M 559. The Bombay High Court in Ravji Narayan Mandlik v. Dadaji Bapuji I.L.R. (1875) R 523 has taken the same view. Mannu Lal v. Fazal Imam I.L.R. (1911) A 580 is to the same effect. Following these decisions we must hold that the Courts below are right in deciding that their jurisdiction was not ousted by the Pensions Act. We dismiss the second appeal with costs.


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