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Krishnadoss Vithaldoss Vs. Ghanshamdoss and Narayanadoss and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported in(1925)49MLJ311
AppellantKrishnadoss Vithaldoss
RespondentGhanshamdoss and Narayanadoss and ors.
Cases ReferredSrinivasa Murthy v. Venkatavarada Aiyangar
Excerpt:
- - a suit for an office or for the removal of a person from an office is a well-known form of action......property, the subject-matter of the suit, was outside the jurisdiction if the suit was a suit for land. leave to sue was applied for and obtained in this case because all the defendants did not reside within the jurisdiction and part of the cause of action may be said to have arisen beyond the jurisdiction of this court. that leave to sue was granted in the first instance ex parte. to revoke that leave would not be to confer or take away any jurisdiction possessed by the court in respect of the suit if it was a suit for land. even if the order of the learned judge refusing to revoke the leave to sue be set aside, the question would still remain whether this court had jurisdiction in respect of the suit. but mr. grant, on behalf of the respondent, intimated that this appeal might be.....
Judgment:

Victor Murray Coutts Trotter, C.J.

1. No one, I think, using language in its natural sense, would ever think of describing this plaint after the excision of the two grounds which Mr. Grant gave up, as befog a suit for land, but it is said that there are decisions of this and other Courts which compel such a construction to be put on those words as would bring the present suit within them. It is sufficient for me to say that I do not think that any one of the authorities cited has that effect. I only desire to say one thing ; and that is chiefly in reference to the case in Srinivasa Aiyangar v. Kannappa Chetty (1915) 30 MLJ 120 that, if that case is to be supposed to say that you are entitled to look at the amended Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of construing the words of the earlier statute, namely the Letters Patent with which we are concerned, I do not agree with it. But I am by no means convinced that that case is an authority for the position for which it was cited. The appeal must be dismissed. The appellant will pay plaintiffs' (respondents') costs. The memorandum of objections is dismissed, no order as to costs.

Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.

2. The expression ' suit for land,' it seems to me, must be construed as an action the primary object of which is to establish claims regarding the title to property or possession of property and no suit can be described as a ' suit for land ' as the result of the decision in which the title to, or possession of, immoveable property will not in any manner or measure be directly affected. Further, the preposition ' for ' in the expression ' suit for land ' would seem to indicate that the title to, or possession of, immoveable property must be the primary object of the action. A suit for an office or for the removal of a person from an office is a well-known form of action. This is a suit merely for the accounts of the management of a trust and for the administration of a trust. The decision of this Court, confirmed by the Privy Council in the case of Srinivasa Murthy v. Venkatavarada Aiyangar (1911) ILR 34 M 257 : 1911 21 MLJ 669 is that an action for administration of an estate is not a suit for land even though the whole of the immoveable property belonging to the estate may be outside the local limits of the Court. I do not see how on principle the present suit differs from an administration action. This being a suit for an account of the management of a trust by the first and second defendants and really a suit for the administration of a trust referred to in the plaint, it seems to me that the same principle applies and it cannot possibly be described as a ' suit for land,' and, therefore, excluded from the jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Judge was right in that decision. I may also add that the original application made on behalf of the 1st defendant to the learned Judge was to revoke the leave to sue granted by the Court. Leave to sue could not possibly have been granted in a case in which the whole of the property, the subject-matter of the suit, was outside the jurisdiction if the suit was a suit for land. Leave to sue was applied for and obtained in this case because all the defendants did not reside within the jurisdiction and part of the cause of action may be said to have arisen beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. That leave to sue was granted in the first instance ex parte. To revoke that leave would not be to confer or take away any jurisdiction possessed by the Court in respect of the suit if it was a suit for land. Even if the order of the learned Judge refusing to revoke the leave to sue be set aside, the question would still remain whether this Court had jurisdiction in respect of the suit. But Mr. Grant, on behalf of the respondent, intimated that this appeal might be dealt with as though it was an appeal from a decision on a preliminary question whether the Court had jurisdiction to try the action, and, by consent of both the appellant and the respondents, the appeal was so treated. The result of our decision, therefore, is that the Court has jurisdiction in this particular case having regard to the nature of the suit. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.


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