Kuppuswami Ayyar, J.
1. The only point argued in this appeal is that on the facts stated there could be no forgery, because the signature that is said to have been forged is the signature of the idol of Venkatachalapathi and the idol cannot be said to be a person. In Ex. A the document in question it does not appear that the signature in it was shown as the signature of the idol of Venkatachalapathi. It reads as if it is the signature of a person by name Venkatachalapathi. The fact is that the property stood in the name of the idol of Sri Venkatachalapathi and the patta was sought to be transferred from the name of the idol to the name of the first accused by the document, Ex. A. On the strength of the observations in Ramalinga Chetti v. Sivachidambara Chetti (1918) 36 M.L.J. 575 : I.I.R. Mad. 440 it is urged for the appellant that Venkatachalapathi is not 'a specific person, real or artificial.' The observation made in that page relates to a general dedication at the time of ceremonial occasions of Hindus where the offering is made for the satisfaction of Sri Hari Janardana. Sri Hari Janardana was, understood by Seshagiri Iyer, J., not as an idol, but as the universal soul which pervades all beings, and therefore he observed that such an offering made to such a person would not be an offering to a specific person, real or artificial.
2. The question for consideration therefore is whether Venkatachalapathi is a person as defined in the Indian Penal Code. In Section 11, the word person ' is defined as including 'any company or Association, or body of persons, whether incorporated or not.' The definition is not exhaustive and it must be taken to include artificial or juridical persons as well. That an idol could be a juridical person was pointed at page 442 of the very ruling quoted above. It was pointed out that in Jagindranath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi an idol was spoken of as a juridical person. In the next sentence it was observed that an idol was a person capable of owning property. Venkatachalapathi, the idol, is a juridical person ' and therefore ' a person ' as defined in the Indian Penal Code.
3. That a document will be forgery even if it is a false document in the name of a fictitious person is clear from Explanation 2 to Section 464, Indian Penal Code. So, in any view of the case, even if the person Who is shown to have signed Ex. A as Venkatachalapathi was a non-existent person it will not make it any the less a forged document.
4. No other point is urged for the appellant. I therefore confirm the conviction. The sentence cannot be said to be excessive. The appeal is dismissed.