P.V. Rajamannar, C.J.
1. We agree with the learned Judge, Mack, J., and with the trial Judge that Exhibit A-1, the raji decree in O.S. No. 15 of 1920 on the file of the Sub-Court of South Malabar at Palghat is inadmissible in evidence because it was not registered. The case of the plaintiff was that under that raji the defendants 1 and 2 were allowed to be in possession of the properties as permanent tenants subject to a condition that they should not mortgage of assign or otherwise alienate the properties and impliedly there should be a forfeiture if there was any alienation. The suit was brought on the ground that the defendants had alienated the properties.
2. As the raji was not registered, it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot rely upon any clause in it which gave him a right to forfeit the permanent lease on alienation. This is in effect what the learned Judge, Mack, J., has held. He agreed with the trial Court in dismissing the plaintiff's suit.
3. Mr. C.K. Viswanatha Ayyar, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that if Exhibit A-1, the raji decree, was inadmissible in evidence, there was no proof of a permanent lease. We do not think that this argument is open to the appellant in view of the statement in his plaint that the suit properties were allowed to be held by defendants 1 and 2 subject only to the payment of ten paras of paddy and one rupee per annum. The appellant's counsel however objected to this statement alone being taken into account without the other statement that there was a stipulation that the properties should not be alienated. He relied upon the rulings in Motabhoy Mulla Keshabhoy v. Mulji Haridas (1915) 28 M.L.J. : 1915 L.R. 42 IndAp 103 : I.L.R. 39 Bom. 399 (P.C.), and Birendra Malik v. Brahma Brata Ray I.L.R. (1946) Cal. 652. But these decisions have no bearing on the facts of this case. In these cases there was what may be called a conditional admission, and it was ruled that the admission alone without the condition could not be pressed against the person making the admission. In this case there is. no such conditional admission. There is a categorical statement of the grant of what in effect must be deemed to be a permanent lease and there is also a further statement as regards an additional stipulation which is in the nature of a restraint on alienation while the grant of a permanent lease was practically admitted by the defendants, this stipulation was not accepted by them.
4. There is also another ground on which the plaintiff's suit should fail and that is the ground on which the trial Judge dismissed the suit. Though Exhibit A-1 was inadmissible for want of registration, it is now well established that such a document can be looked into for other and collateral purposes, particularly to ascertain the nature of the possession which a party obtained under that document. The leading case on the subject is the decision of the Privy Council in Varada Pillai v. Jeeverathnammal (1920) 38 M.L.J. 313 : 1920 L.R. 46 IndAp 285 : I.L.R. 43 Mad. 244 (P.C.). Now it is quite clear that the possession of the defendants from the date of the raji in 1924 was possession as permanent lessees. Such possession they continued to have for over the statutory period and therefore they must be deemed to have acquired rights as perpetual lessees by adverse possession. Mr. Viswanatha Ayyar contended that this rule of law will not apply to the case of acquisition of the right of permanent lessee. We do not see any logical reason why it should be so. The two decisions cited by him in Datto Shivram v. Babasaheb Malhar I.L.R.(1933) 58 Bom. 419, and Naranchandra Chakrabarti v. Kaliprasanna Sarkar I.L.R.(1931) Cal. 396, have no application. We agree with the learned Judge that the plaintiff's suit must fail. The appeal is dismissed.