Walter Salis Schwabe, K.C., C.J.
1. This is an appeal under the Letters Patent, Oldfield and Venkatasubba, Rao JJ. having differed in A. A. O. No. 226 of 1922.
2. The point is a very short one. The Judge of a Court in the Mofussil having risen for the day went to his club. At his club he was approached by a Vakil who asked him to receive a plaint, it being the last day for the expiration of the period of limitation. The learned Judge accepted the plaint and cancelled the stamp on it by writing upon it the words ' presented to me by ' giving the name of the Vakil ' at 7-30 p. m., and signed and dated it. It is argued that nevertheless that suit is barred, because it has not been instituted within the period limit. Section 3 of the Limitation Act runs thus: ' Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25 (inclusive) every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed.' It is argued that the suit was not instituted on that day. Now turning to the Code of Civil Procedure, O. IV Rule 1 provides that ' every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf.' The Judge of the Court could appoint himself or any one else as the officer to whom a particular plaint was to be presented. There is nothing in the rule to show that the presentation must be within office hours, or must be to the officer appointed at the Court or at any particular place and 1 see no reason at all why if a Judge so chooses, he should not constitute himself the officer to receive the particular plaint at any place that he chooses. it is a matter which is not without authority, for precisely the same circumstances arose in Thakur Din v. Hari Das (1912) ILR 34 A 482 (FB). In that case the memorandum of appeal was presented to the District Judge at his private residence after office hours and he accepted it taking the precaution to state that it would be admitted subject to his having got the power to do so. The Full Bench of Allahabad held that he had the power. The Division Bench here differs. Oldfield, J. stated that the ruling in Thakur Din v. Hari Das (1912) ILR 34 A 482 (FB) had no application to Madras, because, although in Allahabad it might be the custom for judges to be approached outside Courts, in his experience it has not been so in a Madras. Venkatasubba Rao, J., on the other hand, gave instances of the numerous kinds of applications to his knowledge that had been made to Judges in Madras when away from the Court and outside ordinary office hours.
3. I agree with the Full Bench decision in Thakur Din v. Hari Das (1912) ILR 34 All 482 (FB), and I see no reason at all to say that the same principle should not be applied in Madras. The appeal will be dismissed with costs.
Coutts Trotter, J.
4. I am of the same opinion. I think that what pressed Oldfield, J., was the idea that, if you state that a Judge may receive plaints in this way out of office hours, you are committed to the further proposition that he must, With great respect to the learned Judge, I think that that is a fallacy. I think that it is in the discretion of the Judge to act as he did in this case or refuse to do so; and, if the thing became a nuisance, I have no doubt that judges would refuse to oblige litigants by taking documents in this way. I should like it to be understood that, so far as I am personally concerned, any such application would be received by me with great disfavour.
5. I agree with the judgments just delivered.