(1) We are definitely of the view that the admission of this writ appeal would be outside the true function and scope of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Briefly stated, the facts are that appellant was the President of the Ukkaram Panchayat, and he filed W. P. No. 415 of 1964 before Srinivasan J., for the issue of a writ of certiorari, quashing the order of he Joint Collector, Coimbatore, removing the petitioner from the post of President, consequent upon what the Collector held to be a valid motion of 'No confidence' passed against the President.
(2) The writ petitioner contended before the learned Judge (Srinivasan J.) that, though, undoubtedly, there was such a motion of 'No confidence' passed against him, it was not a valid resolution, because, four of the participating members had become disqualified by reason of non-attendant at three consecutive meetings of the Panchayat. On this aspect, there was a controversy on a question of fact before the learned Judge, regarding the last meeting alleged to have been convened on 7th November 1963, could not be accepted, for the consequence was that the ground of disqualification advanced, viz., non-attendance at three consecutive meetings by the concerned members, failed to be established. Further, the Tahsildar, who had the duty to determine any urgent question or point of order arising during the course of a proceeding, did consider this question of the alleged disqualification of the members, and decided that that objection was not sustainable and that the vote of 'No confidence' was validly passed. The learned Judge finally concluded that there was no room of interference in writ jurisdiction.
(3) Before us, the same grounds have been reiterated. Learned counsel stresses that under S. 27(2) of Madras Act 35 of 1958, the matter ought to have been placed before the next meeting of the Panchayat, but that the President (writ petitioner) could not do this, as it was held that he had forfeited the right of office by reason of the valid 'No confidence' motion. In our view, where an Act itself provides a statutory mode of determining a controversy of fact of this character, it would be wholly out of place for a party, claiming to be aggrieved, to seek relief at the hands of this court under Art. 226 and virtually to convert that jurisdiction into a trial on an issue of fact. It is sufficient for us to point out that S. 28(1) of Madras Act 35 of 1958 makes explicit provision for determination of any question of alleged disqualification of a member, where there is a dispute this matter, and there is a further prescription of a judicial authority who has to be approached for a conclusion on the dispute, 'whose decision shall be final'. Under those circumstances, we are quite unable to see how the writ petitioner (appellant) would be in order in approaching this court, invoking its writ jurisdiction virtually to undertake an investigation into a disputed question of fact, and to give relief on that basis. In the light of this principle, the writ appeal cannot be entertained and it is dismissed in limine.
(4) Appeal dismissed.