1. There is a preliminary objection to the maintainability of these appeals, based upon the fact that when the applications were filed in 1938 no right of appeal existed. This objection is supported by the Full Bench Judgment in Vasudeva Samiar, In re (1928) 56 M.L.J. 369 : I.L.R. 52 Mad. 361. , That was no doubt a case in which during the pendency of certain proceedings a right of appeal was taken away; but in our opinion there is no logical distinction between a right of appeal and a right to a final judgment without an appeal. Both are equally vested rights. We hold accordingly that the principles of Vasudeva Samiar, In re (1928) 56 M.L.J. 369 : I.L.R. 52 Mad. 361. , applies to this case, and we see nothing in the rule establishing the right of appeal that 'expressly or by necessary intendment' gives it retrospective effect.
2. We do not think the rulings cited by the learned Government Pleader are of any assistance to him. In Guruswami Pillai v. Veerabhadra : AIR1929Mad497 . great stress is laid by the learned Judges on the fact that the change there dealt with is a change only in procedure which does not take away a right of appeal. K. C. Mukerjee v. Musammat Ram Ratan Kuer (1935) 70 M.L.J. 105 : L.R. 63 IndAp 47 : I.L.R. 15 Pat. 268 (P.C.). and Municipal Council of Sydney v. Troy A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 128. are decisions which depend upon the interpretation of particular sections in particular statutes. We uphold the preliminary objection and rule that these appeals do not lie.
3. The learned Government Pleader then asks us to treat them as revision petitions but we see no indication of any such miscarriage of justice being involved in the alleged errors in the learned District Judge's procedure as would justify our interference.
4. The appeals are dismissed with costs of the contesting respondents.