1. Though there may be certain Calcutta decisions confining rather strictly the powers of magistrates in respect of orders directing under Section 144, Clause (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code ' any person to abstain from a certain act ' the Madras cases (See Ramanadhan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti I.L.R. (1900) M. 45 and Queen Empress v. Abdulla Sait I.L.R. (1900) M. 262 have not taken such a restricted view of the section.
2. In the present case, the Magistrate has merely restrained the 2nd party (petitioners before me) from trying to exercise any acts as melvaramdar or to assist first petitioner to exercise such right.
3. I do not think this order would exceed his powers under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In his attempt to define those melvaram rights the Magistrate may have included rights which do not really pertain to the melvaram proprietor, and this may be prejudicial to the tenants, but the order against the counterpetitioners has not been made against them as tenants. It could not affect the petitioners who are only prohibited from exercising the melvaramdar's right and not from exercising the rights which may belong to them or any of them as tenants.
4. Of course, if the Magistracy tries to use Section 144 as a means of granting a perpetual injunction in favor of one of two opposing parties instead of as an order to meet a temporary urgency, the High Court has the power to interfere to prevent such abuse of powers.
5. The order now in question will expire in two days.
6. I therefore reject this Petition.