1. The only direct authority available to us on the question whether the District Munsif, who was asked to execute the decree, had the power to extend the time allowed for payment in the decree which was passed by the High Court, is C.M.S.A. No. 29 of 1909 in which it was held that the appellate court which passed the decree was the proper court to which the application should be made for extending the time. We are not propared to lay down a different rule. The ruling is in accordance with the dictum of Bahshyam Aiyangar J. in Vedapuratti v. Vallabha Valia Raja (1901) I.L.B. 25 M. 300 where that learned Judge points out that extending the time fixed by the judgment of an appellate court for the performance of a condition amounts to an amendment of it. The general rule is that 'specific directions contained in the mandate of the appellate court are beyond the judicial discretion of the lower court and hence must be implicitly followed by the latter court.' See American Cyclopaedia of Law and Procedure, Vol. III, p. 481.
2. It also seems to us that the direction to pay the amount of Rs. 50 must be read as a condition precedent. The decision in Ramasami v. Sundaram I.L.R. (1907) M. 28 supports this view.
3. The petition must therefore be dismissed with costs. We do not decide the question whether the court should extend the time if a proper explanation is made to it for the purpose.