1. The sales sued upon are in terms admittedly absolute, and the alleged agreement to resell, whenever the purchase-money is repaid, is found by the Judge not to have been proved. This being so, the title to the property is in the plaintiff, and as registry follows title, it is clear on the merits the plaintiff must succeed, unless the suit is, as held by the Judge barred by limitation. The Judge finds that the Collector refused to register the plaintiff's name in May 1876, and, upon that finding, he considers that the claim is barred by Article 120 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act. He appears to us to have misapprehended our former judgment, wherein it was stated that the time would begin to run from the Collector's refusal to register. The refusal must be absolute and unqualified, negativing the plaintiff's right to the property, of which registry was sought. The evidence in the case discloses only a conditional refusal, and it does not show that the Collector ever denied the appellant's title, or that he did more than refuse to register unless and until the defendants appeared before him and admitted the plaintiff's title or the plaintiff obtained, what is equivalent to such admission, a decree of Court. The appellant's title being absolute upon the facts now found, we are of opinion that no question of limitation arises, and that the claim must be decreed with costs throughout.