Venkataramana Rao, J.
1. The main point argued by Mr. Raghava Rao in this second appeal is whether the suit property can be the subject-matter of a public charitable trust so as to attract the provisions of Section 92, Civil Procedure Code. It is a tope inam consisting of 13-78 acres in the village of Paladugu. Both the Courts have taken the view that a public charitable trust was created in respect thereof and framed a scheme in regard thereto. Tope inams are a familiar class of charitable grants made by ancient rulers for the benefit of the public or a section of the public for example, the villagers of a particular locality. The date of the original grant is not known and the grant has not been produced. All that we have in this case is an extract of the fair Inam Register and the inam title issued at the time of the enfranchisement of this inam. A reference to the inam Fair Register shows that the grant was a dharmadayam grant and the grantee was a person known as Anidi Venkata Narasu who was described therein as dharmakartha. In the remarks column appears the following statement:
Subject to the condition of the tope being preserved and the produce applied to charity.
2. The evidence also shows that this tope was being utilised as a place of shelter for the villagers, for the cattle and for wayfarers. Therefore, both from the nature of the grant and from the enjoyment in regard thereto, the suit property must be intended to have been dedicated to the use of the public, that is, the villagers and wayfarers who resort thereto during the course of their travel. It will, in my opinion, be clearly a public charitable trust and there is nothing to preclude the application of Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, to it. I find that the same view was taken with regard to a similar grant by Ramesam and Venkatasubba Rao, JJ., in Appeal No. 231 of 1926. Mr. Raghava Rao relied on a case in Kupparazu Venkatasubbiah v. Murugula Shaik Silar Sahib (1915) 32 I.C. 947 where there was a grant to one individual subject to his performing certain duties to the public, and it was there held that the mere fact that the grantee was enjoyed to perform certain duties for the benefit of the public, would not make it a public charity. In this case it has been found that the produce of this tope was being distributed among the villagers. This negatives the idea of any beneficial ownership in any individual but tends to support the view that the grant was intended for the benefit of the public. Therefore, the view taken by the learned District Judge in paragraph 4 of his judgment seems to me to be correct, and I see no reason to differ from it.
3. Mr. Raghava Rao contended that the provision in scheme as framed in Appeal No. 231 of 1926 in and by which a portion of the land was allowed to be cultivated and the produce taken by the members of the family of the original dharmakartha subject to their utilising the produce for the preservation of the tope may be adopted in this case. I am not inclined to introduce any such provision in the scheme framed in this case. No doubt the nature of the original grant in this case is not known, but such enjoyment as is known seems to point to the entire village having the beneficial use of the property and not a single individual. The scheme as framed seems to be reasonable except that it requires a modification, namely, that in case the adoption of the sixth defendant is established in separate proceedings which I understand are pending he will be entitled to be a trustee along with the plaintiff and the defendants. Subject to this modification this second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
4. Leave refused.