In Re: Solai Goundan and Four ors. - Court Judgment
|Judge||Charles Arnold White, C.J., ;Sankaran Nair and ;Tyabji, JJ.|
|Appellant||In Re: Solai Goundan and Four ors.|
|Cases Referred||Muthiah Chetti v. Emperor I.L.R.|
criminal procedure code (act v of 1898), section 106 - appellate court, jurisdiction of, defined. - central excise act, 1944.[c.a. no. 1/1944]. section 11: [p. santhasivam, a. kulasekaran & s. tamilvanan, jj] possession of property taken by bank under the securitisation & reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest act, 2002 - claim towards tax due priority - held, where the bank took possession of the property under section 13 of the s..r.f.a.e.s.i. act, it would be a secured creditor and would have precedence over crowns debt namely excise department in instant case, in the absence of specific provision of first charge in central excise act as well as customs act. generally, the dues to government i.e., tax, dues etc (crows debts) get priority over..........powers given by the section and not to the courts by which these powers are, in the first instance, exercise-able. 'we are unable to agree with the decision in muthiah chetti v. emperor i.l.r. (1906) mad. 190 and in the other cases referred to in the order of reference in which that decision was followed. we would answer the question which has been referred to us in the affirmative.
1. We are of opinion that the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court to order a person who has been convicted of one of the offences mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not restricted to cases where the conviction was by one of the Courts specified in the sub-section. The, words 'an Appellate Court' are quite general and the word 'also' indicate, that the powers given by the section may be exercised by the Courts mentioned in Sub-section (1) and by any Appellate Court.
2. We think the words 'under this section' in Sub-section (3) have reference to the powers given by the section and not to the Courts by which these powers are, in the first instance, exercise-able. 'We are unable to agree with the decision in Muthiah Chetti v. Emperor I.L.R. (1906) Mad. 190 and in the other cases referred to in the order of reference in which that decision was followed. We would answer the question which has been referred to us in the affirmative.