1. The first contention on behalf of the appellants is that Section 28 of the Legal Practitioners' Act is inapplicable to this case in that Gummanna Heggade by whom the original promissory note was executed was not a party to the suit in which plaintiffs' father acted as pleader on behalf of the defendants. The section is, however, too comprehensive to limit it to agreements entered into by pleaders with the parties themselves. The words include all agreements entered into by a pleader with ' any person retaining or employing him in respect of business done or to be done by such pleader.' The consideration for the plaint promissory note is merely the previous note, Exhibit A, which was executed by Gummanna when employing plaintiffs' father as pleader for the defendants in the suits which they were defending. Such being the case, the lower Courts are right in holding the agreement to be invalid under Section 28 of the Act by reason of its not having been filed in Court.
2. The next contention is that, even if the agreement is invalid, plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for the legal fee, or at least for the amount admitted by defendants to be due; and in support of this contention reference is made to Krishnasami v. Kesava I.L.R. 14 Mad. 63.
3. As was observed by Straight, J., in Razi-ud-din v. Karim Bakhsh I.L.R. 12 All. 169, the object of Section 28 is 'to protect necessitous, improvident or careless litigants from being taken advantage of by unscrupulous legal advisers; and provision is, therefore, made for agreements for remuneration in excess of and apart from the amount allowable in taxation of the costs, whereas Section 29 recognizes the right of a pleader to recover the amount due to him independently of such agreement, for the costs, fees, charges and disbursements in respect of the business done.'
4. The District Judge must, therefore, be asked to find what is the amount legally due to the late Kristna Poi, pleader for the defendants, independently of the promissory notes, Exhibits A and B.
5. In compliance with the above order, the District Judge submitted his finding which was accepted, when the case came on for final disposal and judgment was delivered accordingly.