Kunhi Raman, J.
1. This is an application to revise an order made by the learned District Munsif of Tenali by which he -allowed a petition presented on behalf of the second respondent here that she may also be impleaded as a party to a suit O.S. No. 66 of 1935. The application was presented under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The relevant portion of the rule is worded as follows:
The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order... that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually, and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
2. It is obvious from this provision that the Court in making an order directing a new party to be added must be satisfied either that that party ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant or that the presence of that party is necessary to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. From the order of the learned District Munsif it appears that at the hearing of the application, the Vakil for the plaintiffs was absent and only the first plaintiff was present in person to represent his objections. The learned District Munsif says that the first plaintiff was unable to explain what detriment would be suffered by him if the petition was granted. Then he says that he sees no detriment that would be caused to the plaintiff if the second respondent here were brought on record as the second defendant. He also says that he does not see how it widens the scope of the suit or changes the character of it. From these statements contained in the order it is clear that the learned District Munsif did not apply his mind to the essential requisites prescribed by Order 1, Rule 10 and therefore it became necessary for the learned Advocates for the parties to address lengthy arguments before me in support of their respective contentions.
3. The suit was filed by three plaintiffs and the main reliefs asked for in the plaint were the following:
(1) to declare the plaintiffs' hereditary right to perform archaka service in the Chennakesava Anjeneya Swami Varu Temple situated in the village of Nidubrolu;
(2) to remove the defendant from the position of archaka and to declare that the defendant has absolutely no right to the archaka service;
(3) to remove the defendant from possession of the house mentioned as item 2 in the schedule to the plaint and to put the plaintiffs in possession thereof;
(4) to direct the defendant to give the plaintiffs the property mentioned in item 3 of the schedule to the plaint or its value; and
(5) to grant a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering in future with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of the rights to perform archaka service.
4. The following geneological table is necessary to understand the plaintiffs' case as disclosed in the plaint.
Venkata Narayana- Ramacharlu Mangacharlu-
charlu - died in 1921. (died) 1st plaintiff.
| | |
Daughter Daughter- Daughter petitioner
(died). 3rd plaintiff before the trial Court
married 2nd who has been directed
plaintiff by the trial Court to
be impleaded as 2nd
5. The plaint allegations are to the effect that the hereditary right to the archaka service in the temple was vested in the ancestors of Venkata Narayanacharlu and Ramacharlu who were both the brothers of the first plaintiff that these two brothers are now dead but that during their lifetime they were both of them performing the archaka service personally each of them doing duty alternately for six months at a time in the year and that as remuneration for such service they were enjoying separately in 'two shares the archaka service inam lands. The first plaintiff's case according to the plaint is that on the death of Ramacharlu his right to enjoy the one-half of the archaka service inam lands and his right to perform archaka service for a period of six months in the year devolved on the first plaintiff. The case of the second and third plaintiffs according to the plaint is that on the death of Venkata Narayanacharlu whose daughter the third plaintiff is, the corresponding rights which vested in Venkata Narayanacharlu devolved on the third plaintiff and her husband the second plaintiff. How the third plaintiff's husband, the second plaintiff became entitled to this right is not explained in the plaint. The plaint goes on to say that the second plaintiff's father Rajagopalacharulu Garu was in actual management of the right mentioned above on behalf of the plaintiffs and while he was in such management he had appointed the defendant as a temporary clerk for performing the archaka service and had put him in possession of the house mentioned in Schedule B to the plaint on the distinct understanding that he should relinquish archaka service and deliver possession of the house whenever he was called upon to do so. Subsequently an arrangement was made between the first plaintiff ;on the one hand and the second and third plaintiffs on the other according to which the latter were to perform the archaka service alternately for six months at a time in the year and the first period of the six months ended on the 30th of June, 1933. Thereupon the first plaintiff caused the second and third plaintiffs to send a registered notice to the defendant informing him that the first plaintiff's right to perform the service for six months commenced on the 1st of July, 1933 and that since the plaintiffs had decided to perform the service themselves the defendant should relinquish such service and deliver possession of the house and other perquisites that were given to him during the time that he was called upon to perform such service. To that notice the defendant replied stating that he was appointed archaka not on behalf of the plaintiffs but by the trustees of the temple appointed under the Hindu Religious Endowments Board.
6. The first defendant in his written statement alleged inter alia that the first plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in respect of the temple because he had been given away in adoption to another family as a result of which he had lost all his rights in his natural family and that on the death of Venkata Narayana Charlu, his rights devolved on his two daughters, namely, the third plaintiff and her sister the respondent who has now on her application been directed by the Court below to be impleaded as second defendant. Thus the first defendant's version was that neither the first plaintiff nor the second plaintiff had any interest whatsoever in the archaka service or in the service inam lands but that the right involved in the suit was vested in the third plaintiff and her sister, the second respondent to this application. The first defendant also asked in his written statement for further particulars as to how the right that was vested in Venkata Narayanacharlu devolved upon the third plaintiff and her husband the second plaintiff and stated that on such particulars being furnished he would plead further. It was after this written statement was filed that the second respondent who as already stated is the sister of the third plaintiff came forward with her application to be impleaded as a party to the suit. Her version in the petition filed by her was that during the minority of herself and the third plaintiff their uncle Rajagopalacharlu Garu who is also the father-in-law of the third plaintiff was invested with the right of managing the temple and the service inam lands and also performing the archaka service on behalf of the two sisters. Her case therefore was that she was entitled to one-half of the suit properties, that she had an equal joint interest with the third plaintiff in the suit property and that consequently she was a necessary party to the suit. This application was resisted before the trial Court on behalf of the three plaintiffs who contended that in case the petition was allowed and the respondent was impleaded as a party, it would lead to a triangular fight about title and that the effect of including her as a party would be to convert the suit which was one in ejectment into a suit based on title. They also pleaded that the right of the present respondent if any to the temple lands had become barred by limitation. These are the main contentions that are urged before me on behalf of the petitioners by their learned Advocate Mr. Govindarajachari. He relies on the English decisions reported in Moser v. Marsden (1892) 1 Ch. 487 and also on the decision of a single Judge of this Court reported in Sri Mahant Prayaga Doss v. Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras : (1926)51MLJ148 . There are other reported cases relied on by him in support of his contention that the second respondent should not have been impleaded as a party to the suit and those are the decisions reported in Narayanaswami Naidu v. Subbaramulu Naidu (1934) 68 M.L.J. 236, Virbhadrappa Shilvant v. Shekabai (1938) 41 Bom. L.R. 249 , Secretary of State v. Murugesa Mudaliar : AIR1929Mad443 and Abdul Gafur v. Alt Miahe 28 C.W.N. 805.
7. The learned Advocate for the respondent on the other hand contends that the subject-matter of the suit concerns the newly added party and that the suit is not a simple suit in ejectment but that it is a suit for a declaration that the three plaintiffs are solely entitled to a hereditary right to perform archaka service in the temple and to enjoy the service inam lands. He contends that as a joint interest in those rights is claimed by the second respondent her presence as a party to the suit is necessary to avoid multiplicity of suits. In support of his contentions he relies mainly upon the decision in Vydianadayyan v. Sitaramayyan I.L.R. (1881) 5 Mad. 52 which has been followed by Venkatasubba Rap, J., in the decision reported in Secretary of State v. Murugesa Mudaliar : AIR1929Mad443 . He also relies upon the decision in Montgomery v. Foy, Morgan and Co. (1895) 2 Q.B. 321, Sivarama Pillai v. Ganesarathnam Pillai : AIR1935Mad353 , Krishnaswami Naidu v. Municipal Council, Bellary : AIR1937Mad641 and Bavajee v. Annapurnamma : AIR1929Mad403 (1). I am satisfied that the contentions of the learned Advocate for the respondents are well founded in view of the main relief asked for by the three plaintiffs in their plaint. This, in my view, is a case in which the presence of the second defendant-respondent before the trial Court is necessary within the meaning of Order 1, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. By avoiding to implead her as a party to the suit the plaintiffs are seeking to obtain a relief which will not completely dispose of all the matters in controversy involved in the suit.
8. The learned Judges who decided the case reported in Vydianadayyan v. Sitaramayyan I.L.R. (1881) 5 Mad. 52 were Sir Charles Turner, C.J. and Muthusamy Aiyar, J. The decision turned on the scope of Section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877. Under that section also the Court had the power of directing a person to be made a party:
Whose presence before the Court may be necessary to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.
9. These are the words that occur in Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the present Code also. Dealing with these words the learned Judges say as follows:
Is it meant by these words that a person not originally impleaded is to be made a party only if the questions raised in the suit cannot otherwise be completely and effectually determined between the parties to the suit? or is it meant completely and effectually determined so that they shall not be again raised in that or in any other suit between the parties to the suit or any of them and third parties? To accept the more restricted interpretation involves the addition of words which we do not find in the section, namely, 'between the parties to the suit....
10. This seems to me to be a complete and effective answer to a similar argument addressed in the present case by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. Following the decisions reported in Vydianadayyan v. Sitaramayyan I.L.R. (1881) 5 Mad. 52 and Secretary of State v. Murugesa Mudaliar : AIR1929Mad443 , I therefore hold that the learned District Munsif acted correctly in allowing the petition of the second respondent to be impleaded as a party to the suit. This Civil Revision Petition is in the circumstances dismissed wiih costs. The order staying the trial before the Court below is cancelled.