1. The challenge is of a notification under S. 4(l) of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894, hereinafter referred to as the' Act'. The power of dispensing with the provisions of S. 5A of the Act has been invoked under S. 17(4) of the Act. I heard Mr. T. Chengalvarayan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Learned counsel made one submission only and that is there is no warrant at all to dispense with the provisions of S. 5A of the Act, since the purpose is only for construction of office and residential complex (and also to prevent haphazard development) for the newly formed Kamarajar district. The question as to whether urgency exists or not is a matter solely for the determination of the Government and it is not a matter of judicial review. This Court will not 'De entitled to go into the question as 1 to whether the decision was taken on proper material and in an objective manner. The district is admittedly a newly formed one. If' urgency was felt to construct offices and residential complex for the officials for the newly formed district, it cannot be stated that the opinion was based on no facts not relevant or was based on facts at all. It is patent that there -had been a proper application of the mind. The prevention of haphazard development is also an ancillary necessity, because due to lapse of time, owners in spite of acquisition proceedings are prone to indulge in haphazard development with ulterior motive, which may later prove to be hurdles in executing the purpose of acquisition. In this view, this writ petition is dismissed.
2. Petition dismissed.