1. This petition is to prohibit the fifth respondent, the Regional Transport Authority, South Arcot, from issuing temporary permits to each of the rest of the respondents on the route Tindivanam to Uppuvelur, via Brahmadesam. It is not in dispute that four temporary permits were first issued in January 1962 on the route. Temporary permits were again issued in May and September 1962. It is also not denied that similar permits have been issued in January 1963 too, though the temporary permit issued to the fourth respondent is for a different route, part of which lies on the route Tindivanam to Uppuvelur. Prohibition is asked for on the ground that such successive grants of permits is an abuse of power Under Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
2. The contention on behalf of the petitioner certainly appears to have force. It is true that where a power is granted, it is not exhausted by repeated exercise of it. But the power under Section 62 has its limitations. That section clearly contemplates the occasions on which only the power to grant temporary permits can be availed of. It may be that the circumstances of any or all of the purposes may be such that repeated exercise of the power Under Section 62 may be called for. But if the circumstances show that the need is not a, temporary one, but a permanent need, that will be the point at which the line should be drawn when the power Under Section 62 will no longer be available.
3. The fact that temporary permit has to be issued in succession on more than three occasions over a period of one year demonstrates that the need there for can in no sense be regarded as a temporary one. Nevertheless I am not inclined to think that the fifth respondent has abused the power Under Section 62 in granting temporary permits for the forth time, because it does appear from the record sent upto this Court that there was correspondence between the Transport Commissioner on the one hand and the Highways department on the other as to the restoration of the road on the route to proper condition. It also appears from the record that calling for applications for permanent permits is in contemplation. I do not refer to these circumstances to suggest that they will in themselves be a justifying factor to invoke the power Under Section 62. But they are relevant to show that exercise of the power in the instant case is not an abuse, so to speak.
4. I would have been inclined to issue a rule but for the circumstance that it is evident from the record that there is a permanent need for sufficient number of buses on the route and that by issuing the rule the travelling public it) the sector should not be put to inconvenience. Further it is not disputed that the temporary permits had already been issued and the buses are running. In view of this, though this Court does not think it fit to issue a rule, I should at the same time make it clear that the circumstances will not any more warrant the authority, the fifth respondent, granting temporary permits on the route, and that the fifth respondent should take immediate steps to call for application for giant of as many permanent permits as he considers proper and necessary. As soon as the permanent permits are issued, the temporary permits will automatically cease to have force. Subject to the said observations, this petition is dismissed. No costs.