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Sivapuram Sri Sivagurunathaswami Koil by Trustees, Sethu Chettiar and anr. Vs. Sarangapani Ayyangar and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1946Mad79; (1945)2MLJ380
AppellantSivapuram Sri Sivagurunathaswami Koil by Trustees, Sethu Chettiar and anr.
RespondentSarangapani Ayyangar and anr.
Cases ReferredIndia v. Raghunatha Thatha
Excerpt:
- - 2. so far as the second defendant is concerned, i am clearly of the opinion that he cannot be called a ryot within the meaning of the act. after stating that the second defendant was to hold and enjoy the crops standing on the land absolutely with powers of alienation and that possession has been delivered of those crops, the deed describes the property sold in the schedule as only the plantain crops standing on r. he was to take and enjoy the crops on the land and was not entitled to anything more......to try this suit. the first defendant took the land on lease from the temple trustees under the lease deed ex. p-1 dated 2nd april, 1934 for a period of five years. it is unnecessary to decide whether padugai land, which means according to the observations contained in secretary of state for india v. raghunatha thatha-chariar,1 land on the lower-level bank breadth of the river between the edge of the sandy stream bed and the high flood-level bank is ' ryoti' land within the meaning of the madras estates land act. even though it may not be part of the river bed it may be part of the river bank in which case also, as in the case of river beds, the land would not be comprised within the definition of ryoti land. but the point need not be pursued further as the first defendant remained ex.....
Judgment:

Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J.

1. Plaintiffs have preferred this appeal from an order directing their plaint to be presented to the revenue Court on the ground that one or other of the two defendants is a ryot with occupancy rights in the land for the recovery of which the suit has been brought and that the Civil Courts have therefore no jurisdiction to try this suit. The first defendant took the land on lease from the temple trustees under the lease deed Ex. P-1 dated 2nd April, 1934 for a period of five years. It is unnecessary to decide whether padugai land, which means according to the observations contained in Secretary of State for India v. Raghunatha Thatha-chariar,1 land on the lower-level bank breadth of the river between the edge of the sandy stream bed and the high flood-level bank is ' ryoti' land within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. Even though it may not be part of the river bed it may be part of the river bank in which case also, as in the case of river beds, the land would not be comprised within the definition of ryoti land. But the point need not be pursued further as the first defendant remained ex parte in the Munsiff's Court and has stated here through his learned Advocate that he does not propose as against the plaintiffs (appellants) to raise any such contention, as it would mean that he would be acting contrary to the terms of the lease deed under which he undertook to surrender the property at the end of the term.

2. So far as the second defendant is concerned, I am clearly of the opinion that he cannot be called a ryot within the meaning of the Act. His rights are derived from the sale deed Ex. D-1 executed in his favour by the first defendant on 22nd January, 1936. He is a purchaser only of the plantain crops then standing on the land for a sum of Rs. 268. In more than one place the sale deed makes it clear that his right was only to the crops and nothing more. After stating that the second defendant was to hold and enjoy the crops standing on the land absolutely with powers of alienation and that possession has been delivered of those crops, the deed describes the property sold in the schedule as only the plantain crops standing on R.S. No. 3492. It is true that the second defendant was asked to pay the rent for the remaining two years of the term to the temple; but this obligation cannot convert the status of the second defendant into one of a ryot. He was to take and enjoy the crops on the land and was not entitled to anything more. Such a person cannot be described as one who holds the land for the purpose of agriculture.

3. I hold that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit and direct that the plaint be re-presented to the Court of the first instance so that the suit may be disposed of in accordance with law and in the light of the foregoing observations. Costs will abide the result.

4. No leave.


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