Ramaprasada Rao, J.
1. The Corporation of Madras is the appellant. It figured as the third defendant in O. S. No. 59 of 1968 on the file of the First Additional City Civil Judge, Madras. Six plaintiffs claiming themselves to be members of a Sabha known as Arunadhateya Maha Sabha, filed the present suit for a declaration that the second defendant, who was its quondam President, cannot gift away the property belonging to the Sabha to the Corporation of Madras and that such a gift made by the second defendant or the Sabha to the Corporation of Madras would not bind the plaintiffs as members of the Sabha. The first and the second defendants filed a written statement contending that the Sabha is not in existence as it was dissolved in 1966, that the property was purchased by the second defendant from his own funds and that under a valid resolution dated 9-7-1962 the property was gifted to the Corporation of Madras for running a maternity and child welfare center and a dispensary. The Corporation of Madras contended that none of the plaintiffs excepting the second plaintiff was a member of the Sabha, and sought for a dismissal of the suit on that ground alone. In the main the defence was that the suit was not maintainable. In any event, their case was that they are bona fide transferees and that they made improvements and the suit deserves a dismissal. The following issues were framed:
1. Is the suit property No. 72, Perambur High Road, the separate property of the Second Defendant or is it a trust property?
2. Are the plaintiffs members of the Arundhatheya Maha Sabha and entitled to file the suit ?
3. Has the second defendant the right to gift the suit property to the Corporation of Madras ?
4. Are the proceedings of the Maha Sabha dated 8-7-1962 valid and binding ?
5. To what reliefs are the parties entitled?
2. On issue 1 the lower Court found that it is a trust property but not a public trust. On Issue 2, the Court found that the suit was not maintainable as none excepting the second plaintiff continued to be a member of the Sabha till it was dissolved and such a person cannot, after dissolution, though under the guise of proceedings under Order 1, Rule 8, Civil P. C. maintain the suit in a representative capacity. Effectively the decision was that as the Sabha was no longer in existence, the second plaintiff, who was the quondam member, cannot maintain the suit by adding on to the posse of plaintiffs others who were never members of the Sabha but who belong to the same community. The observation of the Court below that it was the sixth plaintiff who continued as member of the Sabha till the date of dissolution appears to be not correct. Ex. B-6(a) no doubt refers to one P. Nalliah. But the sixth plaintiff is K.K. Nalliah. Learned counsel for the appellant says that they are not the same persons. But he would refer to Ex. B-7, Item 144, and would say that the Corporation was right when it said that the second plaintiff alone was the quondam member on the date of dissolution and not anyone else.
3. After examining the position rather comprehensively the learned Judge held that the suit was not maintainable. But, as is traditional and conventional too, he rendered his findings on Issues 3 and 4 as well. He said that the gift by the second defendant in favour of the Corporation of Madras is not valid and that the proceedings of the Maha Sahba on 8-7-1962 are invalid. In the result, however the suit was dismissed because the Court was of the view that the suit as framed was not maintainable. The Corporation of Madras has filed the present appeal being aggrieved by the findings of the Court below on Issues 3 and 4 which went against it.
4. Mr. Thillai Villalan, learned counsel for the appellant, concedes that suit was dismissed as not maintainable, but being aggrieved by the findings of the Court below on Issues 3 and 4, the Corporation has come up to this Court for relief. It is by now well-settled by high authority that a party not aggrieved by a decree was not competent to appeal against the decree on the ground that an issue was found against him. In Latchayya v. Kotamma : AIR1925Mad264 several Division Bench decisions were referred to by the Court, and it was pointed out that a party in whose favour a decree was passed could not appeal against the decree on the ground that the findings on one of the issues was against the part. A similar view was held by three Division Benches of our Court. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Jamaitun-Nissa v. Lutfun-Nissa, ILR (1885) All 606 took the same view. It, therefore, follows that the decision rendered by the Court below on issues other than Issue 2 will not bind the Corporation of Madras. Mr. Balasubramaniam in fact says that in any future litigation over the suit property, the findings rendered by the Court below on issues 1, 3 and 4 cannot be reeducation in so far as the Corporation is concerned. In this view of the matter the appeal is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.
5. Appeal dismissed.