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Munaganoori Ramayya (Died) and ors. Vs. Idamakanty Veerabhadrachari and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
Subject property; family
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1944Mad512
AppellantMunaganoori Ramayya (Died) and ors.
Respondentidamakanty Veerabhadrachari and anr.
Cases ReferredMohamed Husain Khan v. Kishva Nandan Sahi
Excerpt:
- - the suit is, therefore, clearly in time as regards the younger one. a case of joint tenancy is clearly covered by the expression 'one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit......contends that the right which the plaintiffs seek to enforce in this suit is not a joint right within section 7, limitation act. it is also said that the elder of them could give a discharge on behalf of the younger. the last point may be taken up first. the property in question devolved on the two grandsons with mutual rights of survivorship as held by the judicial committee in venkayamma garu v. venkataramanayyamma bahadur (1902) 25 mad. 678. but as the judicial committee explained the position in the later decision in mohamed husain khan v. kishva nandan sahi the right which descends to a daughter's son is not such as would enable a son of the latter to claim a right by birth in it. if there are two sons of one daughter, the effect of the later decision is that though.....
Judgment:

Somayya, J.

1. Two sons of a daughter of the last male holder filed the suit out of which this appeal arises for setting aside an alienation made by the limited owner and for recovery of possession. The elder of the two attained majority more than three years before suit, but the younger was a minor until within three years before the suit. The question is whether the suit is barred by limitation either as regards both or at least as regards the elder.

2. The learned advocate for the defendants-appellants contends that the right which the plaintiffs seek to enforce in this suit is not a joint right within Section 7, Limitation Act. It is also said that the elder of them could give a discharge on behalf of the younger. The last point may be taken up first. The property in question devolved on the two grandsons with mutual rights of survivorship as held by the Judicial Committee in Venkayamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur (1902) 25 Mad. 678. But as the Judicial Committee explained the position in the later decision in Mohamed Husain Khan v. Kishva Nandan Sahi the right which descends to a daughter's son is not such as would enable a son of the latter to claim a right by birth in it. If there are two sons of one daughter, the effect of the later decision is that though the two sons may take the property with rights of survivorship, it is not coparcenary property in the strict limited sense in which it is used under the Hindu law. It is only with respect to coparcenary property that the elder becomes the manager under the Hindu law and is, therefore, entitled to give a valid discharge on behalf of the younger brother. The property in question not being (coparcenary property under the Hindu law, [the elder brother is not entitled to give a valid (discharge on behalf of the younger. The suit is, therefore, clearly in time as regards the younger one.

3. As regards the other member, I am of opinion that this is a case of several persons being jointly entitled to institute a suit. The two sons of a daughter take the property with mutual rights of survivorship as decided by the earlier of the two decisions just referred to. If there is a mutual right of survivorship, it is strictly a case of joint tenancy. A case of joint tenancy is clearly covered by the expression 'one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit.' The right itself is joint. In the absence of a partition or other circumstances putting an end to the joint tenancy, the property will survive to the survivor. [Under these circumstances, it is impossible to say that it is not a case of several persons being jointly entitled to institute a suit. I, therefore, hold that even as regards the elder, time does not begin to run until all the persons entitled to sue become majors. The second appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. (No leave).


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