1. The appellants who are archakas of a temple applied to the Subordinate Judge of Narasapur to direct the defendant, the trustee, to pay them their salary due for seven months. The subordinate Judge dismissed their application and they prefer this appeal.
2. The contention of the appellants is that there is a provision in the scheme for an application of this kind and therefore the Subordinate Judge was wrong in refusing their prayer. Para. 14 of the scheme is as follows:
Liberty to apply to the Court is hereby granted to the trustee or to any person interested in regard to any matter arising out of this scheme or seeking any modification thereof.
3. The appellants are only Archakas of the temple. If the trustee does not pay their salary, their remedy is by a suit. If the contention of the appellants is to be upheld it would mean that the Court is to administer the trust estate in which a scheme is framed. Could it be said that a person who gives credit to the trustee for temple expenses is entitled to apply to the Court to direct the trustee to pay the amount due to him? We are clearly of opinion that the appellants have mistaken their remedy and they have no right to move the Court by virtue of paragraph 14 of the scheme already referred to, to apply to the Court for relief.
4. The appellants rely upon Prayag Doss Ji Varu Mahant V. Thirumala Sri Rangacharlavaru : (1905)15MLJ133 Damodarbhat v. Bhogilal ILR (1899) B 45 and Prayag Doss Jee Varu v. Thirumala Purisa Sri-rengucharlu ILR (1908) M 406 In view of the recent pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Sevak Jeranchod Bhogilal v. The Dakare Temple Committee (1925) 49 MLJ 25 the above decisions cannot be considered good law; and it is, unnecessary to consider that question, as the appellants do not ask for execution of the decree wherein the scheme is set out but for reliefs in respect of services rendered to the temple. Granting that paragraph 14 gives power to persons interested in the scheme to apply to the Court for relief, the appellants are not persons who come within its put view. In this connection we are constrained to observe that a general clause in the scheme providing for application to the Court with regard to the scheme is ultra vires. No doubt such a clause was put in many schemes, and such clause is opposed to the principle of Section 92 Civil Pro. Code. For such of the matters as are concerned by Section 92, the sanction of the Advocate-General is to be obtained. By the introduction of a clause in the scheme that applications for the removal of the trustee and for the framing of a new scheme can be made to a Court, Section 92, Civil Procedure Code is practically given the go-by.
5. The introduction of such a clause will throw upon the Court not only the heavy burden of deciding petty applications of a vexatious nature, but also of practically administering the trust institution. The Court should as far as possible be saved the trouble of directly or indirectly interfering with the internal management of temples and trust properties. It is not the function of a Civil Court to concern itself with the management of any institution except in so far as it is permitted by the Civil Procedure Code. In Narayanamurthi v. Achayya Sastrulu : AIR1925Mad411 the learned Judges observe at page 718: 'It is far from desirable that Courts should assume to themselves the continued supervision of institutions, for the management of which they are called upon to frame schemes.' They further remark. 'We are disposed to consider though in the view we are taking it is unnecessary to decide the point that such decrees are ultra vires having regard to the express provisions of Section 92 of the Civil Pocedure Code which make:; it imperative that for the purpose of getting certain relief in respect of public charities, suits should be instituted by persons interested after getting the sanction of the Advocate-General.' Narayanamurthi v. Achayya Sastritlu : AIR1925Mad411 was followed by Spencer and Madhavan Nair, JJ. in C.M.A. No. 75 of 1925
6. The cause of action of the appellants is purely a private one and it has nothing to do with the scheme and therefore their application was rightly dismissed by the Lower Court.
7. This appeal is dismissed with costs.