Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J.
1. This civil revision petition is against the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge dismissing the application of the petitioner to implead the ryots said to be on the suit village as party defendants to the suit brought by the respondent
2. After the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, was passed, the Settlement Officer constituted under the Act gave notices to all the interested parties to determine the question as to whether the properties in question were an estate or not. After hearing the ryots as well as the landlords, the Settlement Officer gave his findings. Against those findings, the plaintiff-landlord preferred an appeal to the Estates Abolition Tribunal constituted under the Act. That Tribunal upheld the finding of the Settlement Officer that it was an inam estate. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a writ application to quash the findings of the Tribunal. There also the plaintiff lost, but he was directed to establish his rights by a properly framed suit. The plaintiff therefore brought the present suit.
3. In framing the suit, the plaintiff made only the State Government as party defendant and did not make the ryots on the land, defendants. His reason for doing so is that he does not admit that there is any ryoti land involved in the suit properlies, but contends that the entire land is his private land. When faced with the question as to why the plaintiff made ryots parties in his appeal before the Tribunal as also in the writ application, his answer is that because they were parties to the finding or the Settlement Officer, he had necessarily to make them also parties and they were merely pro forma parties.
4. It has also to be mentioned in this connection that after the suit was filed by the plaintiff, two of the ryots of the village came to the Sub-Court with an application that they should be impleaded as party defendants and their application was dismissed. These ryots who lost the petition did not pursue the matter further to assert their right to be impleaded as parties. The plaintiff-respondent before me relies strongly upon this circumstance to disentitle the Government's application to make the other ryots in the village parties to the suit.
5. It is the contention on behalf of the petitioner before me, represented by the Government Pleader, that the substance of the plaint as also the substance of the relief claimed by the plaintiff in his suit should be taken into consideration and not the mere form which has been deliberately adopted by the plaintiff in order to have an easy way of the matter. The plaint no doubt seeks a relief only for a declaration that the provisions of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 are not applicable to suit lands and that the notification issued and proceedings initiated under the said Act are null and void.
But in the paragraph relating to the cause of action the plaint avers that the cause of action for the suit arose on 30-7-1951, the date on which the Estates Abolition Tribunal gave their finding, on 2-7-1952 the date on which the defendant notified the hamlets, on 21-1-1954, the date on which the High Court was pleased to direct the plaintiff to file a suit.
6. It is fairly clear, having regard to the previous proceedings that the real purpose and object underlying the present suit of the plaintiff is to get an adjudication that the suit lands are not lands in respect of which any ryots could claim occupancy rights and that they are his private lands in which the plaintiff alone is entitled in his own right. Further, the fact remains that the plaintiff is seeking to set aside a finding that has been arrived at and which has been upheld at three stages, in the presence of not merely the plaintiff himself but also in the presence of as many as 8 ryots to whom notice was issued, that the suit land formed part of an inam estate and not the private land of the plaintiff.
It is that finding which is now sought to be set aside by the present suit brought by the plaintiff. That finding, it cannot be denied, has been arrived at after due notice and in the presence of other parties as well. This finding is also the result of the process of law having been set in motion in order to adjudicate as to whether the plaintiff alone would be the person entitled to any rights in the property or there are any other people who are also entitled to occupancy rights and in whose favour the legislation seeks to confer ryotwari pattas.
7. When it is, as I hold, the object of the suit to set aside in effect the findings of three Tribunals that it is an estate and not the private holdings of the plaintiff, it cannot be denied there are other parties whose rights are involved and who could also come up at any time in order to vindicate their rights in respect of the suit lands. Such being the case, whatever might be the bare form of the plaint now before the Court, looking at the substance and the object underlying the plaint, it seems to me eminently a case where there should be final adjudication of the rights not merely of the plaintiff but also the ryots who have already figured in the previous proceedings.
For this purpose, unless the ryots in the village are also before the Court, there cannot be a final adjudication as to what exactly is the character of the suit lands and if the plaintiff alone gets an adjudication in his favour, it does not prevent the other parties coming up before the Court to claim a contrary relief, and the result would be multiplicity of proceedings and suits. It is therefore quite obvious that in order that there should be a final adjudication of the real points involved in the suit, all parties should be brought before the Court and they should be given an opportunity to urge their case.
The attempt of the petitioner therefore to implead the ryots seems to be justified in the circumstances of the case considering the real object underlying the suit. Besides in the ends of justice and in the interests of all parties concerned, it scorns to me also desirable that there should be an adjudication once for all and for that adjudication all the parties that may be affected or interested in the suit land should be before the Court. In that view, I think the learned Subordinate Judge ought to have allowed the application of the State Government for making the ryots of the village parties to the suit
8. Some difficulty was sought to be made out of the vagueness or indefiniteness of the ryots of the village. I do not think there is any real difficulty in this matter because the Civil Procedure Code gives ample scope for making the ryots come on record in a representative capacity. The plaintiff is, therefore, directed to bring on record the ryots of the village under Order 1, Rule 8, C. P. C., by making the necessary application to the Court below and obtaining orders in that direction,
9. In regard to costs that might become payable to the defendants now added at the instance of the State Government, I do not think there is any justice in making the plaintiff pay them any costs if any awarded. The finding of the lower Court on issue (4) is set aside and the suit wilt proceed after the formalities being complied with.
10. The petition a allowed. No costs.