1. The finding of the Lower Appellate Court that Swaminatha Iyer is the legal representative of his mother Seethalakshmi the deceased decree-holder, is not and cannot now be challenged.
2. The District Judge's refusal to allow the appellant to set up in these execution proceedings any agreement prior to decree and his direction to the appellant to seek his remedy in a separate suit cannot however be supported. Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is wide enough to permit any valid objection to be taken by a judgment debtor to the execution of a decree by a decree-holder or the decree holder's legal representative.
3. It was held in Chidambaram Chettiar v. Krishna Vathiar 32 MLJ 13 (FB) by a Full Bench of this Court that even an agreement made prior to the decree as to the manner in which the decree should be executed after it was passed could be pleaded as a bar to the enforcement of the decree as it stood. Here the judgment debtor can raise in bar of Swaminatha Iyer's application to execute the decree obtained by his mother any defence such as that of estoppel which is personal to Swaminatha Iyer because the latter now combines in his own person not only those rights to which he has succeeded in consequence of his mother's death but also those obligations to which he has rendered himself liable in consequence of his separate agreement with the judgment debtor.
4. The appeal is allowed on this point and the District Munsif is directed to hear and determine the execution petition after allowing the judgment debtor to put forward a valid defence that he may see fit to raise in the execution proceedings. The Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal is allowed with costs in this Court.