P.V. Rajamannar, Officiating C.J.
1. The facts which give rise to these two connected appeals are fully set out in the judgment of Yahya Ali, J., and therefore need not be repeated. On the date when Madras Act XV of 1946 came into force, i.e., on the 1st October, 1946, there was a valid execution application pending before the Principal Judge of the Madras City Civil Court to execute an order for eviction obtained by the respondent. Under Section 18, Sub-section (1) of the Act:
all proceedings commenced and action taken under the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945, and the Madras Non-Residential Buildings Rent Control Order, 1945, and pending at the commencement of this Act, shall so far as may be, be deemed to have been commenced or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act and be continued subject to the provisions of this Act.
The execution filed by the respondent was certainly a proceeding which was so pending and must be deemed to have been commenced or taken under Section 9 of the Act. Mr. Raghava Rao, the learned advocate for the appellant, sought to call to his aid the words ' so far as may be' and ' subject to the provisions of this Act' which occur in Section 18(1) of the Act to support a contention that by the time the execution application came to be finally disposed of, the ground on which the original order of eviction was passed, viz., that the tenant had sub-let the premises without the consent of the landlord, had disappeared. We do not consider that there are any facts in this case to prevent the proceeding in execution which had been commenced by the respondent from being continued subject to any of the provisions of the Act. The words ' subject to the provisions of this Act ' cannot mean that an order validly obtained under the provisions of the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945, could be attacked retrospectively in proceedings taken to execute such an order. It is only the further continuance of the proceedings pending on the date of the commencement of the Act that the provisions of the Act would govern. Nor is there anything in the words ' so far as may be. ' to prevent the execution proceedings from being continued.
2. Reliance was placed on Sub-section (2) of Section 18 and Section 9 of the Act and the decision in Banmul Soanmul v. Harackehand Roopchand : (1948)1MLJ256 in which these provisions were construed. What follows from these provisions as construed by the learned Judges in that decision is only this : If there is a final order of eviction passed under the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945, but no proceedings had been taken to execute that order and no proceeding in execution was pending on the date when Madras Act XV of 1946 came into force, then, after the commencement of the Act, no action can be taken to execute the order so obtained. This appears to follow inevitably from the language of Section 9, because under that section it is only an order under Section 7 or Section 8 or an order passed on appeal under Section 12 of the Act that can be executed. The effect of Section 18(2) is that except an order for fair rent, other orders including orders for eviction, will not continue in force after the coming into force of Madras Act XV of 1946. But in this case the feature which distinguishes it from the case in Banmul Soanmul v. Harackchand Roopchand : (1948)1MLJ256 is that a valid proceeding in execution of the order obtained under the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945, was pending at the commencement of the Act. We therefore agree with the judgment of Yahya, Ali, J., and dismiss the appeals with costs (one set).