1. A suit in which the plaintiff in terms prays for a declaratory decree and consequential relief prima facie comes with in Clause 4, Sub-clause (c) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, but if at the same time it comes within any of the other classes of suits specified in the section it must be treated as a suit of that description and dealt with accordingly. A suit such as the present for a declaratory decree that a decree passed against the plaintiff is not binding on him and for an injunction restraining the decree-hold-ers from executing it against him cannot be brought within any other part of the section except Clause 4, Sub-clause(c). So too the other class of suits included in the reference, viz., suits to declare a mortgage or sale-deed not binding on the party executing it, cannot be brought within Clause 8 or any other part of the section except Clause 4, Sub-clause (c). As the present suit for a declaration and an injunction comes within Clause 4 (c) the plaintiff is required by the section to state the amount at which he values the relief sought by him in the plaint which he has to verify, and the ad valorem fee payable in respect of the suit is to be computed accordingly. A Full Bench of this Court has recently held, in a Judgment in Ramiah v. Ramaswami : (1913)24MLJ233 to which one of the referring Judges was a party, that the valuation given by the plaintiff in cases coming under Clause 4 is conclusive, and we do not think it was intended to raise that question again in the present reference, nor are we prepared to re-open it.
2. We have now dealt with the present case of a prayer for a declaratory decree and consequential relief as well, but the terms of the reference include also the case where a declaratory decree of the nature indicated is asked for without any consequential relief. In Tacoordeen Tewarry v. Nawab Syed Ali Hossein Khan and Ors. (1874) 21 W.R. 340 such a suit was held not to be a suit fora mere declaration but for substantive relief. In Naraina Pattar v. Aya Pattar (1874) 7 M.H.C.R. 372 a suit for the cancellation of a document obtained from the plaintiff by fraud was held not to be a spit for a mere declaration but also for consequential relief. In Karam Khan v. Daryai Singh I.L.R. (1881) A. 331 it was held in view of the provisions of Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, that such a suit was a mere declaratory suit and did not involve consequential relief. This was not followed in Parathayi v. Sankumari I.L.R. (1891) M. 294 and was expressly dissented from in Samiya Mavali v. Minammal I.L.R. (1899) M. 490 : 10 M.L.J. 240 as also in Kalabhai v. The Secretary of State for India I.L.R. (1904) B. 19 In Chinnanamal v. Madarsa Rowther I.L.R. (1903) M. 480 : 14 M.L.J.343 the case mentioned in the reference, was a suit for the cancellation and delivery up of a bond, and was held, we think rightly, to be a suit for a declaratory decree with consequential relief under Clause 4 (c). In Chingacham Vitil Sankaran Nair v. Chingacham Vitil Gopala Menon I.L.R. (1908) M. 18 the point was again expressly considered, and it was held that the substance and not the language of the plaint must be looked to, and though the suit in question was held to be a merely declaratory suit not involving consequential relief, the Court at the same time expressed the opinion that where it was incumbent on the plaintiff to get the document set aside before he could question it, it must be treated as involving a prayer for consequential relief and the provisions of Clause 4 (c) would be applicable. This was followed in Achammal v. Achammal : (1910)20MLJ791 where it was held that though only a declaration was asked for, the suit was one for cancellation and that Clause 4 (c) applied. The statement in the Judgment that an ad valorem fee was payable does not mean that Clause 4 (c) was not applicable, because the fee payable in suits falling under this clause is ad valorem, though under the provisions of the section it is computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The most recent decision in Harihar Prasad Singh v. Shyam Lal Singh I.L.R. (1918) C. 615 is to the same effect. Following these authorities, we are of opinion that a suit of the nature indicated in the reference, which merely asks for a declaration is none the less a suit for a declaratory decree with consequential relief within the meaning of Clause 4 (c).