1. The answer to the reference must be in the affirmative It seems to us that claims for possession and claims for mesne profits have always been treated as separate causes of action in the Codes of Civil Procedure following in this the English law. At common law claims for ejectment and for mesne profits were separate causes of action, and before the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 an action for mesne profits did not lie until judgment had been recovered in ejectment. Section 10 of the Code of 1859 expressly provided that a claim for the recovery of land and a claim for mesne profits arising out of such land should be deemed to be distinct causes of action within the meaning of the two preceding sections which dealt with joinder of causes of action in the same suit. When the Code was remodelled in 1877 after the Judicature Act and the Rules of Practice framed thereunder had come into force in England, the language of these Rules was in many instances substituted for the language of the Code of 1859, and; in this way Section 10 dropped out and was replaced by Section 44 (now Order 2, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908) the language of which was taken from Order 17, Rule 2 of the English Rules. The effect however is the same because, when the Rule says that no cause of action shall, unless with the leave of the court, be joined with a suit for the recovery of immoveable property except (a) claims for mesne profits or arrears of rent in respect of the property claimed, or any part thereof, it is quite clear that the legislature considered that claims for the recovery of land and claims for mesne profits were separate causes of action, and that it was not intended to depart from the express provisions to that effect in Section 10 of the Code of 1859. We have also been referred to Payana Beena Saminathan v. Pana Lana Palaniappa (1914) 41 I.A. 142 a decision on Section 34 of the Ceylon Code of Civil Procedure which is in the same terms as Section 43 of the Code of 1882, in which their Lordships discuss the scope of that Rule and lay down that it is not intended to secure the inclusion in one and the same action of different causes of action, even if they arise out of the same transactions, and point out that the provision that an obligation and a collateral security for its performance should be deemed to constitute but one cause of action is a substantive enactment making what would otherwise be two independent causes of action one cause of action for the purposes of the section. This shows that the distinction between different causes of action must be strictly observed. For the foregoing reasons and following the decisions quoted in the reference, Monohur Lall v. Gouri Sunkur I.L.R. (1882) C. 283 Tirupati v. Narasimha I.L.R. (1887) M. 210 Lalessor Babui v. Janki Bibi I.L.R. (1891) C. 615 and Gutta Saramma v. Maganti Raminedu I.L.R. (1908) M. 405 we answer the reference in the affirmative.
2. In accordance with the opinion of the Full Bench Sankaran Nair and Ayling JJ. delivered the following judgment on 16th December 1914.
3. We reverse the decree of the Lower Appellate Court and restore that of the District Munsif with costs in this and the Lower Appellate Court. The amount payable has been found by the Lower Courts to be Rs. 2,284.