Walter Salis Schwabe, K.C., C.J.
1. This reference ought not to have been made to this Bench. The two Judges who heard the matter were agreed, and I see no reason for adding anything to their statements on the points on which they were agreed.
2. The first point is quite a simple one, whether, under Section 52 of the Civil Procedure Code, the income of landed property which has passed from one Zamindar to the next, the property being an impartible Raj, is liable to execution for the debts of the deceased Zamindar, that is to say, in this case, the father of the appellant. Oolagappa Chetti v. Arbuthnot (1875) LR 1 IA 268 is a direct authority for the proposition that the income of such property is liable. The English law is perfectly plain, and to the same effect, as laid down in a long series of cases relating to the income from realty which has descended to the heir-at-law. Stratford v. Ritson 10 Beav. 25 is a good instance, in which it was held that the income of such real property is liable for the debts of the deceased as his assets in the hands of his heir, though it is not to be taken until the corpus is exhausted.
3. There is a further point raised by the reference as to whether the money, income accrued since the late Zamindar's death, which has come into the hands of the new Zamindar can be attached and sold. It can be attached, and it is unnecessary to sell it. The Code has made ample provision for execution upon the money belonging to a deceased person in the hands of another. There was no necessity to refer that point, nor do I think it necessary to say anything about it.
4. The appeals are dismissed with costs.
Coutts Trotter, J.
5. I think that this case is covered by the decision in 1 I.A. 268 and I venture to put in my respectful protest against the reasoning on which this case was referred to this Bench. My brother Oldfield says: ' It is advisable that the rights of decree-holders against the property of a deceased person in the hands of his legal representative should be clearly defined.' Personally I protest against a Bench being called upon to define generally the rights of decree-holders and I entirely decline to do so. It is enough to say that this case is covered by 1 I. A. 268 and this appeal should be dismissed with costs.
6. I agree.