K. Veeraswami, C.J.
1. The judgment-debtor is the appellant before us. and the question is whether to the application he filed for setting aside of the court auction sale at which the decree-holder was the purchaser, Rule 90 of Order 21, Civil P. C was applicable. It is common ground that the judgment-debtor failed to furnish security as required by the proviso to R. 90. The first two courts have found-and Kailasam, J. did not differ-that the properties were sold for an inadequate price as a result of wrong details set out in the sale proclamation regarding those properties. There were material irregularities in giving description of the properties and there was as a result as has been found, a substantial injury caused to the judgment-debtor. On an earlier occasion when the question of necessity to furnish security under Rule 90 came up for consideration in C. M. A. No. 102 of 1956, Anantanarayanan, J. (as he then was) saw force in the contention and said that in view of the decision in Karuppanna Goudan v. Ponnuthayee, : (1956)1MLJ190 Section 47 would apply. But at the same time the learned Judge said that there may also be other matters which should be properly dealt with only in an application under Order 21, Rule 90, Civil P.C. On that view though Section 47 was applicable he set aside the dismissal of the proceedings and directed that the application itself for setting aside the sale should be disposed of afresh in the light of the observations contained in the judgment. But neither of the first two courts made an attempt to decide the question which Anantanarayanan, J. had expected. Kailasam J. felt that although Sec. 47 is wide enough to cover, still the petition would fall as well under r. 90 of O. 21, Civil P.C. On that view he allowed the appeal and dismissed the petition for setting aside the sale. On leave granted by him, the appeal under the Letters patent, comes up before us.
2. Although Section 47 is wide enough to cover this case, on account of the necessity to give effect to the rules under Order 21, they have to be read together and so read, in our opinion, Harindranath v. Bholanath Sahu, : AIR1937All407 , took the correct view. As pointed out in that case, the legislature has by Order 21, Rules 89, 90 and 91 made provision for setting aside a sale in certain events and those rules are applicable to applications made by the judgment-debtor or by the decree-holder for setting aside a sale irrespective of the fact whether the decree-holder or a third person is the purchaser.
3. The next question is whether Rule 90 is applicable to this case. The irregularities pointed out by the first two courts are those in the settlement of proclamation. Wrong particulars and inadequate value had been given by the decree-holder himself in the light of which the proclamation was settled. Rule 90 permits an application to set aside a sale on the ground of irregularity or fraud. But be it noted that such irregularity or fraud must be in publishing proclamation of conducting the sale. Any irregularity or fraud in the settlement of proclamation which precedes its publication or conduct of the sale is not. in our opinion, attracted by Rule 90. this is the view taken by one of us in Ramalingam v. Sankara Iyer. : AIR1964Mad424 . There it was held:
'But, on a closer examination, I am inclined to the view that the words 'material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it' cannot be extended to the material irregularity arising out of a breach of the requirements of R. 66. Separate sets of rules are framed under Order XXI, one set relating to settlement of proclamation and the other to the manner of publication of proclamation of sale. Nevertheless Rule 90 speaks of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting a sale. The rule, the my mind will not, therefore, cover any irregularity in the settlement of proclamation'.
4. In taking that view, the court followed Neelu Neithiar v. Subramania Moothan, 11 LW 59 : AIR 1920 Mad 481. The same view was expressed in Kandaswami Mudali v. Narasimha Iyer. : AIR1952Mad582 decided by a Division Bench. It was there pointed out:- -
'Anything done antecedent to the order of sale has nothing to do with 'conducting' the sale, Again, it is observed by him that the word 'publishing' also refers only to what is done antecedent to the actual conduct of the sale but subsequent to the order directing the sale'.
Recently in Natarajan v. Chandmull Amarchand : (1971)1MLJ474 another Division Bench held that order 21, Rule 90 would apply only where a sale is sought to be set aside on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it, that want of notice under Order 21, Rule 64 or 66 is a stage anterior to the publication of the proclamation of sale under Rule 67 or conducting the sale, and that it will not fall under Order 21. Rule 90. We are of the view therefore, that to the application for setting aside the sale. Section 47 and not order 21, Rule 90 is applicable. That being so, the objection as to the failure to furnish security cannot prevail against the judgment-debtor. The appeal is allowed and the decree and judgment of the first executing court are restored. The appellant is entitled to his costs throughout.
5. We would like to make it clear that the disposal of this Letters Patent Appeal will not be construed as dismissing the execution petition. It would be open to the decree-holder to take further steps in that execution petition.