Govinda Menon, J.
1. The petnr seeks per-mission to appeal to the S. C. against the judgment of this Ct in Cr. R. C. No. 566 of 1950 under Article 134(1)(c), Const Ind, which is in the following terms:
'An appeal shall lie to the S. c. from any judgment or final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a H. C. in the territory of India, if the H. C. certified that the case is ft fit one for appeal to the S. C.'
The words of this article are analogous to the provisions of Section 109(c), C. P. C., which says that an appeal shall He to the S. C. from any decree or order if the case is certified as a as one for appeal to the S. C. Since Article 134(o), has come into force only about a year ago, our attention has been invited only to one or two cases dealing with the interpretation of Article 134(1)(c), but various cases on the applicability or the interpretation of Section 109(c), C. P. C. have been brought to our notice & in the absence of any positive authority we should be guided by what the previous decisions ban laid down regarding the criterion to be adopted in granting leave.
2. Our judgment in 'Chunchu Narayana v. K. Kesappa', Cr R C No. 566 of 1950: : AIR1951Mad500 , is based on a construction of Section 145 (4), Cr. P. C., on which there bad been sharp divergence of judicial opinion. In this Gt three learned Judges, Wallace, Devadoss & Lakshmana Rao JJ. have taken one view, whereas two others, namely, Jackson & Happell JJ. have taken a contrary view. The view taken by the latter Judges has been shared by the Lucknow & Allahabad H. Cs. as well. In this state of conflicting authority we had to choose between two divergent opinions & we preferred to accept the principles of the decisions of Wallace, Devadoss & Lakshmana Rao JJ. on the construction of this section. The question is, whether the proposition of law is of such an importance that leave should be granted? It has to be premised that the order made by a criminal Ct under Section 145, Cr. P. C. is subject to the result of a civil suit & therefore, criminal Ct's decision is only of a temporary nature.
3. In interpreting Section 109(c), C. P. C. in 'Ramanathan Chetti v. Audinatha Aiyangar : AIR1931Mad642 , Ven-katasubba Rao & Madhavan Nair JJ. have laid down that the existence of a question of law of some difficulty is not a sufficient ground for certifying the case to be a fit one for appeal to the P. C., unless it is of general & public importance. The learned Judge, Madhavan Nair J. discussed a large body of case law & came to that conclusion. Is there a question of law of some difficulty & sufficient importance In this case? Probably it might be stated that the question we have to decide is of some importance because of the construction of Section 145 (4), Cr. P. C.; but we do not feel that it is a matter of any great difficulty.
4. In interpreting Article 136 of the Constitution, which lays down that the S. C. can grantspecial leave in criminal cases, their Lordships of the S. C. had to consider when & under what conditions leave should be granted & they held that the only standard which can be laid down, in the circumstances, is that the Ct should grant special leave to appeal only in those cases where special circumstances are shown to exist. Generally speaking the S. C. will not grant special leave unless it is shown that exceptional circumstances exist & that severe & grave injustice has been done & that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. In our opinion these principles are to he followed in deciding whether leave should be granted under Article 134(1)(c) also.
5. The H. C. of Orissa in 'Arjun Misra v. Indian Union', : AIR1950Ori235 , (Ray C.J. & Narasimham J.) had also to consider the pre-requisites for the grant of leave under Article 134(1)(c) & it has been held that since the scope of an appeal to the S. C. against a final order or sentence In a criminal proceeding has not at all been widened, the Ct will have to interfere with convictions by local tribunals within the same bounds of limitation & restraints laid down by the P. C. & the fitness has to be judged by the standard that that tribunal (P. C.) laid down before it in granting special leave to appeal. The only change that the Constitution has introduced is to endow the state H. Cs. with powers to certify, or in other words, to grant leave to appeal. The learned Chief Justice discussed the dictum of Lord Watson in 'In re Dillet', 1887 12 AC 459: 56 LT 615 as well as that of Lord Dunedin in 'Mohinder Singh v. Emperor . Reference was also made to the observations of the Judicial Committee in 'Muhammad Nawaz v. Emperor . No argument has been advanced before us to show that we should not follow the decision of the learned judges. If that is so, the conditions necessary to be present for the H. C. to grant leave are practically the same as the conditions which ought to exist for the S. C. to grant special leave, & if the S. C. is to be guided by what is laid down by the Privy Council in 'In re Dillett', (1887) 12 A C 459: 56 LT 615, it seems to us that this case does not present features necessary for the granting of such, a leave.
6. Recently a Bench of this Ct, to which one of us was a party in 'In re Paddya', : AIR1951Mad329 , had considered the scope of Article 134 & laid down that as the S. C. of India will not interfere with the course of justice in criminal cases in the free fashion of a fully constituted Ct of Criminal appeal & it will interfere only in special cases of great public or private importance or if injustice of a serious & substantial character has occurred, the H. C. cannot grant leave to appeal, unless those circumstances mentioned exist. In that decision a number of cases were cited & discussed &, therefore, it is unnecessary for us to discuss them again. We may also in this connection, refer to another decision in 'Pritam Singh v. The State', : 1950CriLJ1270 .
7. It does not seem to us that the point decided in this criminal revision case is of such general & public importance or is likely tooccur very often that we should grant leave to appeal to the S. C. After all it is not every day that a Mag, who is approached under Section 145, Cr. P. C., does not pass a preliminary order immediately on the receipt of the appln, & what we have decided is that, as it is the duty of the Mag to pass a preliminary order without delay after the receipt of the appln, the delay of the Ct should not affect the rights of parties. We are of opinion that the point under consideration is not of such general or even public importance as to warrant granting of leave to appeal.
8. This petn is, accordingly, dismissed.