1. The main contention of Mr. Krishnamurthi on behalf of the petnr is that, the dispute in this case really relates to a mill, which is situated in the premises mentioned in. the preliminary order & that the definition of 'land' mentioned in Clause 2 to Section 145 does not, include mills & therefore this cannot be the subject of proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. It is no doubt true that the definition of the land mentioned in Clause (2) of the section does not mention mills as being included in the definition. Land or water has been defined to include buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of the land. The definition does not say that the land means buildings, markets etc. It says it includes also buildings, markets etc. The definition is not exhaustive. It is only illustrative. The crops or other produce, i.e., things that could be cut & carried away fall under the definition of the term land. It has been held in 'Rev A. Rampus v. Subba Reddi', : AIR1950Mad658 following 'Emperor v. Gaya Prasad : AIR1948All94 that trees cut & lying in the land came within, the definition of land. As observed by Malik J. in 'Emperor v. Gaya Prasad : AIR1948All94 , Section 145 being a preventive section a liberal interpretation should be given. He has further observed that it must include movable property attached to earth. The chapter in which Section 145 occurs is headed 'Disputes as to immovable properties'. This shows that land in Section 145 is used as synonymous with immovable property whichincludes things attached to earth. Mill therefore which is attached to the earth will fall within the scope of immovable property or land. It is in this view that the dispute though it may be to the mill really includes the dispute to the land in which it is situate & Section 145 will apply.
2. On the merits, I am satisfied that thelower Ct was justified in coming to the conclusion that the Mill was in the possession of theresp here. In the result the petn is dismissed.