1. The only question in this second appeal is whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation under. Article 118 of the Limitation Act. The contention of Mr. Chenchiah is that the adoption was made more than six years before the date of the suit and that the. father of the plaintiff who could have challenged the factum and validity of the adoption did not do so and the plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation, and he relies very strongly upon cases which relate to reversioners bringing suits for setting aside adoptions.
2. The plaintiff is the natural son of the adoptive father. The Appellate Court finds that there was no adoption. The case of the aurasa son of an adoptive father stands on a different footing from that of a reversioner. The cause of action is one and the same whatever may be the number of the reversioners. But the case of a person like the plaintiff is altogether different for the adoption affects him as it affects no one else for if the adoption is held valid his right to the family property would be cut down under the Hindu Law. But if the adoption is held to be not valid then he would succeed to the whole of the family property. That being so, it is difficult to see how cases which relate to suits by reversioners would apply to the case of the plaintiff.
3. As Mr. Varadachariar very well put it, if the appellant's contention is to hold good then in the case of a widow making an adoption if the adoption is not questioned by her within six years of the date of the adoption the adoption could not be impeached by anybody. Surely that is not the Hindu Law. The mere fact that the father who made the illegal adoption was alive for more than six years after the adoption would not bar the right of a son born a year or two after the adoption to question it. The plaintiff is still a minor and it is difficult to sec how Article 118 would apply to a case like this, for the cause of action begins from the time when the alleged adoption becomes' known to the plaintiff. He, being a minor, could not be fixed with the knowledge of the adoption from the date of his birth. The contention is under Section 2(8) of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff must be considered as a person claiming through his father. I am not prepared to accept this contention for the plaintiff's right is quite independent of that of the father. It is therefore unnecessary for me to consider the cases relied upon by Mr. Chenchiah, Hari Prasad Singh v. Sourendra Mohan Sinha I.L.R. (1922) Pat 506, Venkata Sivayya v. Addemma I.L.R. (1920) M 218 , Ayyddorai Filial v. Solai Ammal I.L.R. (1901) M 405 and Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Qhimvolu Perrazu I.L.R. (1906) M 390 : 16 M L J 307.
4. The suit is not for a mere declaration; it is for an injunction as well. The relief as regards declaration is only incidental to the main relief, namely, the injunction prayed for. For, the allegation is that the defendants 1 and 2 are interfering with the enjoyment of the property belonging to the plaintiff and the Court is asked to grant a permanent injunction restraining them from doing so. That being so, I do not think that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 118.
5. In the result the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the plaintiff-respondent.